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POLICE QUOTAS
SHAUN OSSEI-OWUSU*
The American public is slowly recognizing the criminal justice system’s deep
defects. Mounting visual evidence of police brutality and social protests are generating an appetite for something different. How to change this system is still an open
question. People across the political spectrum vary in their conceptions of the
pressing problems and how to solve them. Interestingly, there is one consequential
and overlooked area of the criminal justice system where there is broad consensus:
police quotas.
Police quotas are formal and informal measures that require police officers to issue
a particular number of citations or make a certain number of arrests. Although law
enforcement leadership typically denies implementing quotas, courts, legislators,
and officers have all confirmed the existence of this practice and linked it to odious
criminal justice problems such as racial profiling, policing for profit, and overcriminalization. These problems have led legislators in many states to implement
statutory prohibitions on quotas. Some of these statutes are of recent vintage and
others are decades old. Nevertheless, these prohibitions and their attendant litigation have escaped sustained analytical scrutiny. Legal scholars typically overlook
police quotas, subsume them within other categories (e.g., broken windows
policing), or give pat acknowledgment of their existence without explaining how
they work.
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This Article corrects these omissions and makes two arguments. First, it contends
that police quotas are a significant but undertheorized feature of criminal law and
procedure. Quotas make police rewards and sanctions significant features of punishment in ways that can trump criminal offending and pervert due process principles. Second, it argues that quota-based policing is a unique area where there is
widespread agreement and possibilities for change. Liberals, libertarians, conservatives, police officers, police unions, and racial minorities have all criticized police
quotas. These vastly different constituents have argued that quotas distort police
discretion and produce unnecessary police-civilian interactions. This Article supplements these arguments with a novel descriptive, statutory, and jurisprudential
account of police quotas in the United States. It offers a framework for understanding the arguments for and objections to quotas, and proposes some normative
strategies that could build on statutory and litigation successes.
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INTRODUCTION
Before the Great Lockdown, criminal justice reformers across the
ideological spectrum lamented “policing for profit.”1 Commentators
usually discuss this practice through the more sanitized sounding category of “legal financial obligations” (LFOs).2 The economic implications of the COVID-19 pandemic have put a spotlight on this type of
predatory “cash register justice.”3 As of this writing, the National
League of Cities has reported that 2,100 cities anticipate budget deficits.4 Since hundreds of jurisdictions have relied on LFOs in the past,5
and some have continued to do so during the crisis,6 there is good
cause for concern that LFOs will figure into an uncertain economic
future. As Professor Brandon Garrett notes, “[a]fter the last financial
crisis, most states ramped up on fines and fees,” transformed police
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1 DICK M. CARPENTER II, LISA KNEPPER, ANGELA C. ERICKSON & JENNIFER
MCDONALD, INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE, POLICING FOR PROFIT: THE ABUSE OF CIVIL ASSET
FORFEITURE (2d ed. 2015); Roger Pilon, America’s Frightening “Policing for Profit”
Nightmare, NAT’L INT. (Jan. 23, 2015), https://nationalinterest.org/feature/americasfrightening-policing-profit-nightmare-12094; Emma Andersson & Susan Dunn, ‘Policing
For Profit’ Is Alive and Well in South Carolina, ACLU (Feb. 12, 2019, 3:45 PM), https://
www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-reform/reforming-police/policing-profit-alive-and-wellsouth-carolina.
2 These LFOs include, but are not limited to: “usage fees” levied on defendants for
their arrest, adjudication, incarceration, probation, and electronic monitoring; statutory
fines that impose economic sanctions as punishments for crimes; and civil forfeiture laws
that allow governments to confiscate money and property that are purportedly linked to
crime.
3 See Laura I. Appleman, Nickel and Dimed into Incarceration: Cash Register Justice in
the Criminal System, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1483 (2016) (discussing the turning of the criminal
justice system into a revenue center for state courts and corrections); see also
Developments in the Law—Policing and Profit, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1706, 1723–46 (2015)
(discussing usage fees, for-profit probation supervision and civil forfeiture); Bernadette
Atuahene, Predatory Cities, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 107, 175–78 (2020) (discussing predatory
fees various U.S. cities impose on residents through excessive fines, property forfeiture,
and debtors’ prisons); Beth A. Colgan, Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, 102 CALIF. L.
REV. 277, 285–88 (2014) (describing various economic sanctions, including statutory fines,
restitution, forfeitures, administrative court costs, incarceration costs, parole processing,
and probation fees).
4 NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES & U.S. CONF. OF MAYORS, THE ECONOMY AND CITIES:
WHAT AMERICA’S LOCAL LEADERS ARE SEEING (2020), https://www.usmayors.org/2020/
04/14/the-economy-and-cities-what-americas-leaders-are-seeing.
5 See Mike Maciag, Addicted to Fines, G OVERNING (Sept. 2019), https://
www.governing.com/topics/finance/gov-addicted-to-fines.html (finding through an
extensive national analysis that fines fund “more than 10 percent of general fund revenues
in nearly 600 U.S. jurisdictions”).
6 Brandon L. Garrett, Guest Post: Court Fines and Fees Shouldn’t Be Used to Recover
Lost Revenue from Pandemic, WASH. POST (May 12, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/crime-law/2020/05/12/guest-post-court-fines-fees-shouldnt-beused-recover-lost-revenue-pandemic (“[S]ome jurisdictions are still jailing people for
unpaid debt, potentially exposing them to the novel coronavirus, which is exploding in our
jails.”).
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officers into “revenue collectors,” and relied on “our poorest citizens
to fund basic functions of government.”7
Amidst the epidemiological crisis, the summer 2020 protests
inspired a new, popular reexamination of policing. Rooted primarily
in anger around anti-Black police violence, the protests productively
altered public opinion and amplified longstanding issues tied to the
political economy of policing.8 Concerns about cities using the police
to generate municipal funds—which garnered attention after the
Ferguson unrest six years ago9—remain on the reform agenda. But
now there is closer scrutiny on the core functions of the police. Popular opinion still hews to the belief that law enforcement serves a
public safety function,10 but visual evidence of racialized police killings is applying pressure to that assumption. These instances of state
violence have forced the general public to grapple with the racially
and financially exploitative nature of the criminal justice system.
Lurking beneath these concerns is a practice that has eluded legal
scholars despite its reported prominence in criminal justice administration: police quotas.
Police quotas are formal and informal measures that require
police officers to issue a particular number of citations or make a certain number of arrests. They are sometimes formal and pre-specify a
quantity.11 Other times, they are informal and premised on an implied
understanding that employment actions—promotion, compensation,
or discipline—will be predicated on an officer’s ability to engage in a
“sufficient” amount of enforcement activity.12 Evaluative jargon such
7
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Id.
See Nate Cohn & Kevin Quealy, How Public Opinion Has Moved on Black Lives
Matter, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/06/10/
upshot/black-lives-matter-attitudes.html (noting leftward public opinion shift in support of
race and criminal justice issues).
9 See Editorial, Policing for Profit Perverts Justice: Our View, USA TODAY (Mar. 11,
2015, 7:01 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2015/03/11/ferguson-mo-policetraffic-tickets-justice-department-editorials-debates/70175690 (bringing attention to
“policing for profit” after Ferguson protests).
10 See Kendall Karson, 64% of Americans Oppose ‘Defund the Police’ Movement, Key
Goals: Poll, ABC NEWS (June 12, 2020, 5:30 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/64americans-oppose-defund-police-movement-key-goals/story?id=71202300 (describing how
Americans oppose calls for defunding the police).
11 See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 304.125 (West, Westlaw through 2020 2d Reg. Sess.)
(“No political subdivision or law enforcement agency shall have a policy requiring or
encouraging an employee to issue a certain number of citations for traffic violations on a
daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly, yearly, or other quota basis.”).
12 See, e.g., TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 720.002(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through end of
2019 Reg. Sess.) (“A political subdivision or an agency of this state may not establish or
maintain, formally or informally, a plan to evaluate, promote, compensate, or discipline a
peace officer according to the officer’s issuance of a predetermined or specified number of
any type or combination of types of traffic citations.”).
8
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as “benchmarks,”13 “productivity goals,”14 and a host of other terms
often obscure the operation of what are sheer police quotas.15
Quotas may seem like an inapt object of inquiry considering current calls for radical change as opposed to incremental reforms. But,
as this Article shows, quotas animate important criminal justice issues,
chiefly racial profiling, civil rights violations, and police corruption. In
Floyd v. City of New York, the federal decision that struck down the
New York Police Department’s racially discriminatory stop-and-frisk
policy, quotas were prominent themes.16 The Department of Justice’s
report on Ferguson, which made the country aware of policing for
profit, highlighted quota abolition in its Recommendation section.17
Interestingly, more than twenty states have statutory prohibitions on
police quotas.18 Criminal defendants, civil rights plaintiffs, aggrieved
police officers, and police unions have deployed these statutes in state
and federal courts to challenge quotas and extract concessions from
municipalities.19 Nevertheless, police quotas, like criminal enforcement mechanisms more generally,20 have not received meaningful
consideration by legal academics.21 Instead, scholars typically engage
quotas via the related but analytically distinct practice of broken windows policing or anecdotal accounts.22 This lack of sustained attention
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13 SERDAR KENAN GUL & PAUL E. O’CONNELL, POLICE PERFORMANCE APPRAISALS:
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 71 (2013) (acknowledging the existence of quotas and
noting how some police departments use “benchmark targets for summonses and arrests”).
14 POLICE REFORM ORG. PROJECT, WORKING TOWARDS A MORE SAFE AND FAIR
CITY: ABOLISHING QUOTAS AND INVOLVING COMMUNITIES 2 (2014), https://
www.policereformorganizingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Working_Towards_a_
More_Safe_and_Fair_City.pdf (“‘[P]roductivity goals’[sic] are a euphemism for a ‘quota
system.’”).
15 See infra notes 32–36.
16 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 596–602 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
17 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., C.R. DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE
DEPARTMENT 91 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/
attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [hereinafter Ferguson
Report].
18 See infra Appendix A.
19 See infra Part II.
20 Alice Ristroph, The Thin Blue Line from Crime to Punishment, 108 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 305 (2018) (describing how substantive criminal law scholarship rarely
addresses issues of police conduct).
21 Some noteworthy exceptions that have given some attention to quotas include
Nathaniel Bronstein, Note, Police Management and Quotas: Governance in the CompStat
Era, 48 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 543 (2015) and Mary De Ming Fan, Disciplining
Criminal Justice: The Peril Amid the Promise of Numbers, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1
(2007).
22 On broken windows policing, see generally I SSA K OHLER -H AUSMANN ,
MISDEMEANORLAND: CRIMINAL COURTS AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN AN AGE OF BROKEN
WINDOWS POLICING (2018) (investigating the consequences of broken windows policing in
New York City). For anecdotal accounts, see COREY PEGUES, ONCE A COP: THE STREET,
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persists despite scores of case law,23 empirical evidence,24 references
in government reports,25 and annual settlements,26 that all point to the
existence of police quotas across the country.
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THE LAW, TWO WORLDS, ONE MAN 146 (2016) (former NYPD officer describing the
existence of quotas in the department); NORM STAMPER, TO PROTECT AND SERVE: HOW
TO FIX AMERICA’S POLICE 1–4 (2016) (former San Diego officer describing the existence
of quotas in his department); John Marzulli, We Fabricated Drug Charges Against Innocent
People to Meet Arrest Quotas, Former Detective Testifies, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 13,
2011), https://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/fabricated-drug-charges-innocent-peoplemeet-arrest-quotas-detective-testifies-article-1.963021 (officer admitting that the NYPD
framed people to meet quota requirements).
23 See, e.g., Becker-Ross v. State, 595 S.W.3d 261, 265, 269, 272 (Tex. App. 2020)
(finding that there was sufficient evidence to show that the city administrator pressured the
city marshal to write a certain number of traffic tickets within a specified period in
violation of state prohibition on quotas); Policemen’s Benevolent Labor Comm. v. City of
Sparta, No. 5-19-0039, 2019 WL 5457948, at *1, *7 (Ill. App. Ct. Oct. 22, 2019) (concluding
that a police department’s practice of evaluating citations, traffic stop warnings, and extraduty assignments violated state law prohibiting the implementation of quotas); Gerwer v.
Kelly, 980 N.Y.S.2d 275, 275 (Sup. Ct. 2013) (ruling against an officer who falsified thirtyseven fictious summonses in order to meet an alleged quota requirement); People v.
Schwartz, No. 282028, 2009 WL 30457, at *1, (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 2009) (noting that the
defendant officer’s issuing of four undated speeding tickets to meet a quota would secure
entitlement to overtime).
24 See JOHN MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN & ASSOC.’S, NEW YORK PATROLMEN’S
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION MEMBERSHIP STUDY 53 (2016), https://www.nycpba.org/
media/19346/160315-pbasurvey.pdf (surveying approximately 6,000 members of New York
City’s police union which found that 89% of respondents believed that NYPD supervisors
imposed quotas); Jonathan Auerbach, Are New York City Drivers More Likely to Get a
Ticket at the End of the Month?, SIGNIFICANCE MAG., Aug. 2017, at 25 (using significance
testing to conclude that New York City drivers are more likely to receive a ticket at the end
of the month, substantiating a long-held belief about the use of quotas); Scott W. Phillips,
Police Discretion and Boredom: What Officers Do When There Is Nothing to Do, 45 J.
CONTEMP. ETHNOG. 580, 589 (2016) (qualitative study of a police department finding that
officers noted that there was no formal quota but that they were expected write about ten
tickets a month).
25 See Ferguson Report, supra note 17, at 11; U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., C.R. DIV. & U.S.
ATT’Y.’S OFF., DIST. OF N.J., INVESTIGATION OF THE NEWARK POLICE DEPARTMENT 21
(2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2014/07/22/newark_findings_722-14.pdf.
26 See Mike Sprague, Whittier to Pay $3 Million to Settle Police Ticket Quota Case,
WHITTIER DAILY NEWS (Jan. 16, 2020, 2:11 PM), https://www.whittierdailynews.com/2020/
01/15/whittier-to-pay-3-million-to-settle-police-ticket-quota-case; Matt Sledge, Gretna
Police Agree to $70K Settlement in Ex-Cop’s Lawsuit Claiming Arrest Quotas, NEW
ORLEANS ADVOC., (June 3, 2019, 11:12 AM), https://www.nola.com/news/courts/
article_b1990837-e425-5c46-a3d8-4817a8b81367.html; Joshua Sharpe, DeKalb Still Denies
Police ‘Quota’ System After Settling Suit for $150K, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Sept. 27, 2018),
https://www.ajc.com/news/crime—law/dekalb-still-denies-police-quota-system-aftersettling-suit-for-150k/IuFHQg3pT4lnsVyPETZxkM; Peggy Wright, Mendham Twp. Cop’s
‘Ticket Quota’ Lawsuit Settles for $650K, MORRISTOWN DAILY REC. (Dec. 5, 2017, 8:37
AM), https://www.dailyrecord.com/story/news/2017/12/04/mendham-twp-cops-ticketquota-lawsuit-settles-650-k/918964001; Hailey Branson-Potts & Emily Alpert Reyes, City
Will Pay LAPD Officer Nearly $1 Million to End Lawsuit over Ticket Quotas, L.A. TIMES
(Jan. 13, 2016, 11:05 PM), https://www.latimes.com/local/cityhall/la-me-0114-lapd-
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This Article makes two straightforward arguments. First, it contends that police quotas shape the enforcement of criminal laws by
introducing a host of perverse incentives into an already insecure
body of criminal procedure. This leads to the Article’s second claim. I
argue that quota-based policing is a discrete area where there is widespread agreement about the problems with quota-based policing and
possibilities for change. Police unions, often considered the source of
our penal status quo, have argued that such requirements distort discretion and generate unnecessary police-civilian contact.27 Liberal,
conservative, and libertarian reformers have all lodged similar arguments and emphasized the ways quotas lead to violations of civil
liberties.28
The broad condemnation of quota-based policing makes this
issue a particularly ripe place for reform, and an area that should be
scrutinized by legal scholars and advocates. This Article inaugurates
the conversation. It builds on the fragments of existing scholarship to
offer a robust framework for understanding police quotas. It offers a
novel descriptive and statutory account of police quotas and is the first
piece of scholarship to describe the jurisprudential landscape of this
practice.
Eliminating police quotas would be no panacea. However, it is an
underappreciated area that has synergies with a larger constellation of
penal change strategies. For abolitionists, addressing quotas could be
an interim step toward a world with a smaller police imprint.29 If
advocates achieve the goal of defunding the police, addressing quotas
will become especially central, as smaller police forces may increas43166-nyu_96-2 Sheet No. 83 Side A
05/11/2021 08:20:10

settlement-20160114-story.html; J. David Goodman, Officer Who Disclosed Police
Misconduct Settles Suit, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/30/
nyregion/officer-who-disclosed-police-misconduct-settles-suit.html ($600,000); Dave
Phillips, Former Novi Officer Gets $280,000 in Ticket Quota Lawsuit Settlement, OAKLAND
PRESS (Apr. 17, 2014), https://www.theoaklandpress.com/news/nation-world-news/formernovi-officer-gets-280-000-in-ticket-quota-lawsuit-settlement/article_35e4db17-f817-596598c9-cef2484f562b.html; Joel Rubin & Catherine Saillant, L.A. Approves $6-Million
Settlement over Alleged Traffic Ticket Quotas, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2013, 12:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/local/la-xpm-2013-dec-10-la-me-tickets-20131204-story.html.
27 See infra Section III.C.1.
28 See infra Section III.C.3.
29 See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Supreme Court, 2018 Term - Foreword: Abolition
Constitutionalism, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1, 11, 114–18 (2019) (arguing that abolition
movement activists can utilize the Reconstruction Amendments and “non-reformist
reforms” to temporarily further their aims and ultimately build a society without prisons);
Amna A. Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 405, 460 (2018)
(describing how the abolitionist approach focuses on reducing the greater social and fiscal
footprint of police on society as opposed to efforts to improve the police and criminal law).
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30 Stephen Rushin & Roger Michalski, Police Funding, 72 FLA. L. REV. 277, 285 (2020)
(suggesting that defunding police could lead to excessive ticketing and civil asset
forfeiture); see Ingrid Burrington, What Amazon Taught the Cops, NATION (May 27, 2015),
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/what-amazon-taught-cops (discussing how
algorithmic criminal justice assumes the credibility of the underlying crime data and noting
how “countless scandals over quotas” in policing suggest that this is a huge assumption).
31 See Sidney Fussell, What Disbanding the Police Really Meant in Camden, New Jersey,
WIRED (July 1, 2020, 3:03 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/disbanding-police-reallymeant-camden (describing the increase in electronic surveillance after the city overhauled
its police department); see infra notes 177–83 and accompanying text.
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ingly rely on quotas and technology to do more with less personnel.30
This is precisely what has occurred in Camden, New Jersey, a city that
is considered a model for police reform.31 For law enforcement officials who oppose quotas and a general public who believe the police
have a role in our social order, attention to quotas could lead to more
rigorous conversations about the function of police.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I sketches the different
ways police quotas take shape organizationally. It then offers a brief
legislative history and analysis of anti-quota statutes.
Part II moves to the caselaw and describes how police officers,
criminal defendants, and civil rights plaintiffs have challenged police
quotas. This Part shows how doctrinal and evidentiary hurdles have
hampered claims, but also details how some parties have succeeded in
court or extracted settlements from municipalities.
Part III captures the definitional contours of quotas. First, I discuss the defensibility of this practice. Though often unarticulated,
police quotas give law enforcement leadership a way to monitor, measure, and evaluate police activity while guarding against legitimate
concerns about officers shirking their duties. Such evaluations are
akin to the kinds of assessments that are standard in many workplaces. This Part offers responses to these defenses. It also describes
additional problems that police quotas pose for three groups: police
officers forced to comply with these requirements; marginalized communities that are often the subjects of quota-satisfying officers; and a
general public that can be deprived of efficiently used resources
because of quotas.
Part IV takes a normative turn. This Part offers suggestions for
how to raise public awareness of quota-based policing and generate
coalition-building in states that do not already have quota prohibitions. This Part also provides suggestions on how to improve existing
statutes.
The Conclusion offers thoughts on the urgency of this topic, and
the Appendices offer a comprehensive list of quota bills and statutes.
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I
THE TEXTURE

OF

POLICE QUOTAS

This Part maps the terrain of police quotas. Scholars and the
media often discuss the existence of quotas, but the term itself is often
undefined or poorly described. Section I.A offers a robust representation of how quotas are administered. Section I.B details the statutory
landscape of anti-quota laws and categorizes the twenty-one states
that have enacted such legislation.
A.

The Definitional Landscape

Quotas are formal and informal measures that require law
enforcement to have a certain number of contacts with individuals or
issue a certain number of citations or arrests. Because quotas have a
pejorative connotation, law enforcement organizations use a range of
alternative terms to accomplish the same work. These phrases—which
are sometimes used earnestly and sometimes as subterfuge—include
“benchmarks,”32 “productivity goals,”33 “targets,”34 “performance
management,”35 and “objectives.”36 To get a more granular understanding of quotas, one might consider four features of this police
practice: 1) the level of formality; 2) how they are quantified; 3) the
law enforcement action that is required; and 4) the prospect of an
adverse/favorable employment action.
1.

Formality

32

05/11/2021 08:20:10

GUL & O’CONNELL, supra note 13.
See POLICE REFORM ORG. PROJECT, supra note 14; Robert Gangi, When Police Are
Encouraged to Abuse, Not Protect, ALTERNET (Nov. 30, 2012), https://www.alternet.org/
2012/11/when-police-are-encouraged-abuse-not-protect (“NYPD officials use the term
‘productivity goals’ as a poorly veiled euphemism for the Department’s quota system, as a
thin cover for the pressure placed on street officers to make an expected number of arrests,
or to issue a sufficient number of summonses.”).
34 Malcolm K. Sparrow, Measuring Performance in a Modern Police Organization,
NEW PERSPS. POLICING BULL., Mar. 2015, at 1, 18 (“[S]ome departments set targets for
functional outputs, including enforcement activities such as arrests, stops, searches and
traffic citations.”).
35 Jen Chung, Bloomberg Says Police Quotas Will Be Investigated, GOTHAMIST (Nov. 9,
2010, 5:45 PM), https://gothamist.com/news/bloomberg-says-police-quotas-will-beinvestigated (quoting Mayor Bloomberg as saying “we don’t have quotas . . . but we
certainly have performance management”).
36 TODD DOUGLAS, THE POLICE IN A FREE SOCIETY: SAFEGUARDING RIGHTS WHILE
ENFORCING THE LAW 71 (2017) (noting that many police agencies “have informal quotas:
precinct averages, benchmarks, performance goals, objectives, targets, and other
euphemistic references to what is essentially a quota”).
33
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Quotas range in their formality. Like any other policy, quotas can
operate through formal channels (e.g., in writing or through official
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communication) or through informal mechanisms. A useful example
of a formal quota can be found in Ridgetop, Tennessee.37 The city of
approximately 2,000 people disbanded its police department in 2019
after officers exposed an attempt by the mayor and vice mayor to
impose a quota. Officers recorded both officials demanding that the
department write 210 citations to help generate revenue for the city.38
Another example is from Brooklyn, New York, where a New York
Police Department (NYPD) official posted memos in a police stationhouse detailing how many summonses cops were required to hand
out.39 One document outlined the specific number of tickets needed:
sixty cell phone, fifty seatbelts, sixty-five double park, forty bus stops,
and twenty-five tints.40 Another memo began, “[g]ood day we need
the following,” and proceeded to list various moving violations.41 That
document required that summonses be handed out at accident-prone
locations and specified five intersections.42
Quotas can also be informal and based on unwritten requirements or implied understandings.43 In North Brunswick, New Jersey,
one veteran officer recounted how officers would receive four hours
of overtime pay for every forty tickets written.44 Though the police
department had no official policy, there was an “unwritten understanding.”45 Another law enforcement official described how officers
would “go hunting” in Black and Latinx neighborhoods and compete
to see who could issue the most tickets.46 This kind of informality is
especially common in states that legally prohibit police quotas, since
police brass want to avoid memorializing requirements in ways that
43166-nyu_96-2 Sheet No. 84 Side B
05/11/2021 08:20:10

37 Zuri Davis, A Tennessee Police Department’s Last Officer Resigns over Ticket
Quotas, REASON (Nov. 6, 2019, 2:45 PM), https://reason.com/2019/11/06/a-tennesseepolice-departments-last-officer-resigns-over-ticket-quotas/printer.
38 Id.
39 See Chung, supra note 35.
40 Id.
41 James Fanelli, Cops at Brooklyn’s Crime-Ridden 77th Precinct Told to Meet Quotas
for Moving Violations, Memos Say, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Nov. 8, 2010), https://
www.nydailynews.com/new-york/cops-brooklyn-crime-ridden-77th-precinct-told-meetquotas-moving-violations-memos-article-1.452621.
42 Id.
43 See Rich Morin, Kim Parker, Renee Stepler & Andrew Mercer, Inside America’s
Police Departments, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/
2017/01/11/inside-americas-police-departments (finding that about a third of police officers
say they are expected to meet a quota for arrests and tickets).
44 Sarah Wallace, NJ Police Targeted Black and Latino Neighborhoods to Fulfill Ticket
Quotas, Cops Say, NBC N.Y. (Feb. 13, 2020, 8:08 PM), https://www.nbcnewyork.com/
investigations/nj-police-targeted-black-and-latino-neighborhoods-to-fulfill-ticket-quotascops-say.
45 Id.
46 Id.
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can be subject to discovery in future litigation or scrutinized by the
media.
2.

Numerical Requirements

05/11/2021 08:20:10

47 Rhonda Cook, Arrest Quotas Led Dekalb Officer to Plant Drugs, Lawsuit Claims,
ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Nov. 28, 2016), https://www.ajc.com/news/local/arrest-quotas-leddekalb-officer-plant-drugs-lawsuit-claims/5AMfRowntaQrZfQLsAhL6K.
48 Sharpe, supra note 26.
49 Peter Hall, Lawsuit Ends with Reminder to Pennsylvania State Troopers About Rule
Against Ticket Quotas, MORNING CALL (June 26, 2018), https://www.mcall.com/news/
police/mc-nws-pa-state-police-dui-quota-settlement-20180626-story.html.
50 Jeremy Jojola, A Quota Behind Denver Parking Citations?, 9NEWS (Feb. 27, 2017,
11:12 PM), https://www.9news.com/article/news/local/investigations/a-quota-behinddenver-parking-citations/415777446.
51 Id.
52 Id.
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Police quotas have quantitative dimensions. Sometimes they are
numerically specific, as in the Brooklyn example mentioned above.
Other examples are instructive. Police documents from Dekalb
County, Georgia, for instance, revealed that officials kept detailed statistics on officer activities, with categories including “citation goal[s],”
“total citations,” and “% to goal citations.”47 A slogan for the police
department was, “[t]wo tickets a day keep the sergeants away. Five a
day keep the lieutenants at bay.”48 In Pennsylvania, two officers lied
about a DUI arrest and were caught on police dashcam video conferring about which one would get credit for the arrest because they both
needed their “20 for the month.”49 When criminal justice commentators discuss quotas, they usually focus on these numerically specific
requirements.
But not all quotas are numerically precise. Sometimes the numerical dimension of a quota requirement is just a general guide and some
quotas don’t specify any number at all. On the former, Denver,
Colorado, is noteworthy. Colorado has no statutory prohibition on
quotas. In 2016, the City, which generated $30 million annually from
parking citations, inked a $50 million contract with a software company to manage its parking enforcement.50 Contract documents indicated that predictive algorithms produced a “daily citation
expectation” for agents.51 The City insisted that the goal was not a
strict requirement but a “guide.”52 A legislative audit of West Virginia
State Police, which identified an informal quota regime, illustrates the
further vagueness of quotas that specify no number at all. The
auditor’s survey included many responses from officers who indicated
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that no specific requirements existed, but that “numbers are strongly
emphasized.”53
3. Law Enforcement Activity
Quotas require a particular kind of law enforcement activity. This
is typically an arrest, citation, or ticket. In rare instances, they require
contacts, warnings, or stops. Arrests, citations, and tickets are at the
center of police quotas and constitute much of this Article’s discussion. Allegations and settlements surrounding arrest quotas have
hounded the NYPD for years.54 Citations and tickets were at the
center of the Department of Justice’s Ferguson Report.55 Contacts or
stops require more explanation.
Sometimes contacts substitute for arrests and citations. For
example, in Arizona, a state without a statutory prohibition on quotas,
a Tucson police chief was criticized for an overt one-ticket-a-day
policy. After he changed it to a one-contact-a-day requirement,56
Republicans led a push for an anti-quota bill. Though the Fraternal
Order of Police supported the bill, Governor Doug Ducey ultimately
vetoed it.57 As a result, police in Arizona remain free to use contacts
to fulfill quota requirements.
South Carolina, which does have a statutory prohibition,58 highlights the importance of contacts in police quotas. The Santee Police
Department, situated along the well-traveled Interstate 95, came
under scrutiny in 2019 after a memo demanding “a heavy increase” in
traffic stops surfaced.59 Lieutenant Riley Null authored the memo,
43166-nyu_96-2 Sheet No. 85 Side B
05/11/2021 08:20:10

53 W. VA. LEGIS. AUDITOR, PERFORMANCE EVALUATION & RSCH. DIV., LEGISLATIVE
PERFORMANCE REVIEW–WEST VIRGINIA STATE POLICE: SURVEY COMMENTS 46, 52, 54
(2008). The auditor asked: “Does the WVSP require each Trooper to issue a specified
number of traffic citations or warning citations on a monthly basis?” Some of the responses
included: “No specific #, but we have to show results. . . . No specific number is given, but
‘numbers’ are strongly emphasized. . . . There is no specific number but if you don’t have
contacts they reprimand you. . . . No specific #, but get bad [employee performance
appraisals] or verbally reprimand [sic] for not having a considerable amount of contacts.”
Id. at 43–54.
54 See infra notes 194–95.
55 See Ferguson Report, supra note 17.
56 Howard Fischer, Arizona Bill Would Outlaw Police Traffic Ticket Quotas,
TUSCON.COM (Jan. 23, 2015), https://tucson.com/news/local/crime/arizona-bill-wouldoutlaw-police-traffic-ticket-quotas/article_d6bf8125-aec6-5e2e-ad0d-4ab16b181d4c.html.
57 Ducey argued that “in its current form, I worry that police chiefs and local entities
will be prevented from objectively gauging performance in their departments—a concern
for officers themselves, the public and overall public safety.” Matthew Hendley, Ducey
Vetoes Ban on Police Ticket Quotas, PHX. NEW TIMES (Apr. 2, 2015, 5:57 AM), https://
www.phoenixnewtimes.com/news/ducey-vetoes-ban-on-police-ticket-quotas-6661896.
58 See S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1-245 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Sess.).
59 Michael Majchrowicz, Internal Memo Suggests SC Police Department Violated Law
Banning Ticket Quotas, POST & COURIER (May 16, 2019), https://
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sent it to patrol officers, and called for increased “contacts” with
motorists.60 Null threatened, “if activity is not increased, you will be
required to have your body cameras recording during your entire shift
to try and determine what activity is consuming your time.”61 Because
the South Carolina statute makes an exception for points of contact,62
the memo is likely legal. This is why it is important to offer the definitional landscape of quotas before delving into the statutory prohibitions: many of the statutes that prohibit quotas do not cover the full
range of police activity that could be considered a quota.
4.

Incentives/Adverse Employment Actions

Incentives and adverse employment decisions loom in the background of police quotas. Police departments have offered overtime,
barbeque, pizza, gift cards, car wash coupons, and trophies to officers
who meet quotas.63 Failure to meet quotas can result in adverse
employment actions, including denial of days off, transfers, undesirable assignments, and, of course, termination.64 Police leadership can
communicate the threat of an adverse employment action to an officer
in an attempt to make them comply with a quota. In the cash-strapped
city of Gretna, Louisiana, situated across the Mississippi River from
New Orleans, threats of adverse employment decisions were rampant.
In a recorded conversation with a patrolman, Lieutenant J.R. Rogers
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www.postandcourier.com/news/internal-memo-suggests-sc-police-department-violatedlaw-banning-ticket-quotas/article_aa02a4d6-77f2-11e9-8a32-b75a8475adde.html.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 See § 23-1-245 (defining “points of contact” as a “law enforcement officer’s
interaction with citizens and businesses within their jurisdictions and the law enforcement
officer’s involvement in community-oriented initiatives” and allowing for evaluations
based on this category).
63 Randy Travis, Douglasville Cops Offered BBQ if They Wrote Enough Traffic Tickets,
FOX 5 ATLANTA (Mar. 10, 2020), https://www.fox5atlanta.com/news/douglasville-copsoffered-bbq-if-they-wrote-enough-traffic-tickets (barbeque); Daniela Altimari & John
Lender, Police Commissioner Says ‘Pizza Memo’ Was Not Ticket Quota, HARTFORD
COURANT (Apr. 2, 2012), https://www.courant.com/news/connecticut/hc-xpm-2012-04-02hc-pizza-tickets-report-0403-20120402-story.html (pizza); Justin George, Metro Transit
Police Held a Competition to Encourage Arrests and Other Enforcement, WASH. POST
(Feb. 20, 2020, 7:02 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/
metro-transit-police-held-a-competition-to-encourage-arrests-and-other-enforcement/
2020/02/12/02146d84-4dd7-11ea-9b5c-eac5b16dafaa_story.html (gift cards); Debbie
Dujanovic, Emails Reveal Incentives Behind Cottonwood Police Issuing Tickets, KSL
BROAD. (Oct. 24, 2013, 11:01 PM), https://www.ksl.com/article/27376993/emails-revealincentives-behind-cottonwood-police-issuing-tickets (carwash coupons and gift cards); Jack
Douglas Jr. and Jason Allen, One North Texas Officer Says Ticket Quotas Do Exist. . .And
It May Be a Ticket to a Trophy, CBS DFW (May 20, 2013, 10:23 PM), https://
dfw.cbslocal.com/2013/05/20/one-north-texas-officer-says-ticket-quotas-do-existand-it-maybe-a-ticket-to-a-trophy (trophies and letters of appreciation).
64 Cook, supra note 47.
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B.

Statutory Landscape

This subsection briefly describes the politics that animated some
of the legislative prohibitions on quotas. Some of these statutes are of
late-twentieth-century vintage and developed against the backdrop of
police professionalization. These early anti-quota laws were driven by
interests in police work conditions, public safety, and fair policing.

05/11/2021 08:20:10

65 Michael Isaac Stein, Police Lawsuits Provide an Inside View of Cash Register Justice
in Louisiana, SCALAWAG (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.scalawagmagazine.org/2018/11/
louisiana-cash-register-justice.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 See, e.g., CRIME + PUNISHMENT (Hulu 2018) (describing a conversation in which an
NYPD lieutenant tells an officer that he needs to “catch up with everybody” in terms of
numbers of arrests).

43166-nyu_96-2 Sheet No. 86 Side B

insisted, “[s]omebody has got to go to jail every 12 hours,” and
threatened termination if the subordinate failed to comply.65 Another
officer testified that officers were told the city would stop paying for
their insurance and contribute less to their retirement fund if they did
not increase their arrests and citations.66 The tethering of quota compliance to job security was so blatant that one officer gave a sergeant
who was recently passed over for a promotion “a gift of knee pads,
vaseline [sic], and ink pen refills—the implication being that the only
way he’d be able to get that promotion was to either write up more of
his patrolmen for not meeting the quota or perform sexual favors.”67
Understanding these four features of quota-based policing—the
level of formality, the nature of the numerical requirement, the
enforcement activity demanded, and the potential employment
actions—is important for a few reasons. First, the scholarly literature
has yet to offer a robust description of quotas that captures the different permutations of the practice. Second, statutory prohibitions fall
short of capturing the full scope of police activities that constitute
quotas, which partially explains why quotas still exist in places that
have enacted rules proscribing the practice. Third, these categories
highlight gray areas in a non-transparent culture of policing. The
strongest version of a quota would be a memorialized demand that
police arrest a specific amount of people or face termination. A less
detectable iteration might involve an informal communication to an
officer to “increase their activity” with no threat of adverse employment outcome.68 Such conduct would be permissible under some statutes and prohibited in others. Therefore, having a definitional grasp of
these features is integral to understanding the following discussion
about statutory prohibitions.
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These issues, along with concerns about racial justice, have continued
to inspire more recent statutes. After explaining this history, this subsection categorizes the various anti-quota statutes.
1.

A Brief History

05/11/2021 08:20:10

69 See Measure to Outlaw CHP’s Ticket Quotas, BERKELEY GAZETTE, July 22, 1975, at
1 (describing Miller’s role in helping pass California’s anti-quota law).
70 David Mundstock, Chapter 10 – The June 1976 Campaign and the New Slate Politics,
BERKELEY CITIZENS ACTION, https://berkeleycitizensaction.org/?page_id=397 (last visited
Dec. 28, 2020).
71 See Measure to Outlaw CHP’s Ticket Quotas, supra note 69, at 1.
72 Id.
73 Id.; see Ferguson Report, supra note 17, at 2 (“This emphasis on revenue has
compromised the institutional character of Ferguson’s police department, contributing to a
pattern of unconstitutional policing, and has also shaped its municipal court, leading to
procedures that raise due process concerns and inflict unnecessary harm on members of
the Ferguson community.”).
74 See Bronstein, supra note 21, at 544.
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The legislative history of quota prohibitions is scattered because,
in many states, legislators passed these laws without fanfare. However,
a close inspection can impose some coherence and highlight themes of
public safety, police conditions, and police corruption. Noteworthy legislative activity surfaced in the 1970s. Black Democratic Assemblyman
John Miller ushered California’s bill in 1975.69 Miller, who has been
described as a “progressive independent in local politics,” was politically shrewd and couched his support for quota bans in inclusive rhetoric.70 The Howard University-trained lawyer—whose district included
the racially and socio-economically diverse cities of Oakland and
Berkeley—voiced a simultaneous concern for police officers and for
the public. Describing quotas as “unfair, undemocratic, and unjust,”
Miller was troubled by the idea that failure to meet quotas could lead
to an officer’s demotion.71 At the same time, Miller expressed concern
about “the average California driver” who would be unbelieved by a
“rubber stamp traffic court system which finds 90 percent of those
cited guilty.”72 Finally, Miller highlighted due process issues and presaged the problems the Department of Justice would find forty years
later in Ferguson when he stated: “The spectacle of cities gaining revenue for the conviction of citizens, and judges creating revenue by
making criminals out of those brought before them . . . goes against
our historical concepts of justice and fair play.”73 In many ways,
California’s statute was motivated by multi-constituent concerns that
remain applicable today.
New York passed its bill in 1978, and though police and the public
may have been beneficiaries, the statute was a response to outright
police corruption.74 The Commission to Investigate Alleged Police
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Corruption, or the Knapp Commission (led by United States District
Court Judge Percy Knapp), produced one of the earliest and most
extensive insights into the use of quotas in modern urban policing.75
The Commission found that “informal arrest quotas” were “an
inducement to a particular kind of corruption,” most specifically, “the
arrest of individuals not actually apprehended in the commission of
the charged crime.”76 Testimony to the Commission described “a pattern of requiring a quota of four felony arrests per month.”77 The
informal policy led to a practice of “flaking,” which is when police
plant drugs on suspects.78 The longstanding, sexist practice of
arresting sex workers and not their procurers also featured prominently in New York’s quota-based culture. “Plainclothesmen assigned
to prostitution details were faced with the necessity of producing a
stipulated number of arrests a night and, in order to do so, often
arrested persons they considered to be ‘obvious’ prostitutes, without
obtaining sufficient legal evidence.”79
Finally, the Commission unearthed widespread collusion between
police and numbers runners, particularly in “ghetto neighborhoods”
where investigators discovered “numerous bookmaking operations
and some high-stakes, organized card and dice games.”80 These operations were brazenly public and payoffs to police ensured that these
activities would go unpunished, “except for token arrests made to give
an appearance of activity.”81 The report’s description, which reveals
the intricacy of corruption and its relationship to quotas, is worth
quoting at length:

AND THE

CITY’S

05/11/2021 08:20:10

75 COMM’N TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION
ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES, COMM’N REP. 28 (1972).
76 Id. at 28.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 71.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 83.
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Most often, when plainclothesmen needed a token arrest to meet
arrest quotas or to give the appearance of activity, they would tell
the operator of a spot and arrange a time and place for the arrest.
The operator would then select someone to take the arrest, who was
usually either one of his employees who had a relatively clean arrest
record or an addict who was paid for his trouble. Whoever took the
arrest would put a handful of bogus policy slips in his pocket and
meet the plainclothesman at the designated time and place, where,
often as not, he would get into their car without even waiting to be
asked.82
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83 See Jim Mitzfield, Ticket Quotas Cost Undeserving Drivers: Police, S. BEND TRIB.,
Sept. 1, 1987, at B2; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.750 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 2020,
No. 256 of 2020 Reg. Sess.).
84 Mitzfield, supra note 83.
85 Police Banned from Using Speeding Ticket Quotas, J. TIMES (Mar. 25, 1998), https://
journaltimes.com/news/national/police-banned-from-using-speeding-ticket-quotas/
article_a6faa127-90da-566f-a702-d46300ecf88f.html.
86 Reid Magney, Officials Say Standards Are Needed for Police, LA CROSSE TRIBUNE,
Jan. 8, 1998, at A6.
87 Adam Schrager, Legislators: State Patrol Policy Lists Quota, is ‘Against the Law,’
CHANNEL3000 (Dec. 28, 2018, 1:32 AM), https://www.channel3000.com/legislators-statepatrol-policy-lists-quota-is-against-the-law.
88 See Ben Winslow, Utah Could Soon Ban Police Quotas in Traffic Stops, FOX 13 (Feb.
5, 2018, 11:58 PM), https://www.fox13now.com/2018/02/05/utah-could-soon-ban-policequotas-in-traffic-stops.
89 Id.
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Whereas work conditions and the unfair doling out of tickets
helped generate the enactment of the California statute, in New York
it was the excesses of police culture and corruption that necessitated
statutory prohibitions on quotas. In the ensuing decades, many states
would pass laws that drew on one or more of these rationales.
Concerns about the work environment of police inspired the
enactment of a few statutes. Democratic State Representative Perry
Bullard introduced Michigan’s statute in 1988 after speaking with
police officers who described how the pressure to comply with quotas
diminished their ability to fight crime.83 During testimony for the bill,
Jack Brown, executive director of the Fraternal Order of Police,
lamented, “One of the most disgusting things we have as police
officers is these quotas.”84 Wisconsin, led by Republican State
Assemblyman DuWayne Johnsrud, passed its bill more than a decade
later in 1998.85 Before the bill’s passage, Johnsrud said, “[a]ny time an
officer has to work under a quota, he has to make decisions with a
hammer hanging over his head.”86 Reflecting on the bill fifteen years
after its passage, Johnsrud’s rationale was the same. He explained that
the bill came at the wishes of the State Patrol Troopers Union, which
was concerned that officers were writing tickets at the expense of
other safety-related work.87 In Utah, Republican State Senator
Howard Stephenson helped the state pass its bill in 2018.88
Stephenson noted his opposition to police operating as revenue generators and claimed, “I don’t believe policemen should be looking to
meet a quota on bad behavior. What if there isn’t enough bad
behavior? Do you just have to make it up?”89 The various statutes,
passed in states spanning the east coast to the west coast, demonstrate
the public safety-interested, police officer-protecting nature of quota
prohibitions.

43166-nyu_96-2 Sheet No. 88 Side B

05/11/2021 08:20:10

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\96-2\NYU203.txt

546

unknown

Seq: 18

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

10-MAY-21

15:01

[Vol. 96:529

Racial controversy has also inspired some states’ prohibitions on
police quotas. After the killing of Michael Brown exposed Ferguson’s
police practices, then-state congressman and future Republican
Attorney General Eric Schmitt shepherded Missouri’s legislation.
Schmitt said that he authored the bill to “ensure that our citizens
wouldn’t simply be used as ATMs to fill municipal government coffers.”90 The police killing of Walter Scott, an unarmed Black motorist,
likely led to the enactment of South Carolina’s statute. After thirtythree-year-old officer Michael Slager stopped fifty-year-old Scott for a
broken taillight, Scott fled, and Slager shot him in the back.91 Slager
claimed that he struggled with Scott over his taser and shot him out of
fear.92 Video evidence taken by a bystander later revealed that Scott
was seventeen feet away when the officer shot him and that Slager
had dropped his taser near him in “an attempt to plant evidence and
skew the investigation.”93 Justin Bamberg, a civil rights attorney who
represented the Scott family and serves as a Democratic
Representative in the South Carolina General Assembly, subsequently authored the bill.94 After Tennessee passed its quota bill in
June 2020, Democratic Representative Rick Staples noted that quotas
lead to Black people being frisked by police officers, and said that the
“legislation will limit unnecessary contact between the two.”95 The
existence of bipartisan and multi-constituent opposition to quotas is
apparent from the widespread enactment of these statutory
prohibitions.
2.

Types of Quota Prohibitions

05/11/2021 08:20:10

90 Missouri’s Attorney General Sues City of Marshfield for Illegal Traffic Ticket Quota
Scheme, KY3 (Dec. 9, 2019, 4:06 PM), https://www.ky3.com/content/news/Missourisattorney-general-sues-city-of-Marshfield-for-illegal-traffic-ticket-quota-scheme565986731.html.
91 See Alan Blinder, Michael Slager, Officer in Walter Scott Shooting, Gets 20-Year
Sentence, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/07/us/michaelslager-sentence-walter-scott.html.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Grace Beahm, Haley Signs Bill Banning Law Enforcement Ticket Quotas, POST &
COURIER (June 9, 2016), https://www.postandcourier.com/politics/haley-signs-bill-banninglaw-enforcement-ticket-quotas/article_7449a3c5-b4ff-509f-b716-7bd7b72a38c7.html
(reporting on Bamberg’s representation of the Scott family and his sponsorship of the bill).
95 Tyler Arnold, Criminal Penalties for Issuing Police Ticket Quotas Passes Tennessee
House, CENTER SQUARE (June 11, 2020), https://www.thecentersquare.com/tennessee/
criminal-penalties-for-issuing-police-ticket-quotas-passes-tennessee-house/article_eb5a2f34ac0e-11ea-b5cc-6fd6b8293d42.html.
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This subsection details the different types of anti-quota laws. The
varying types of legislation make straightforward generalizations
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tricky. Indeed, the difficulty of offering a general framework might
help explain the scholarly gap on police quotas. Some of these laws
are either poorly drafted or cover a small amount of activity. Consider
two examples. Florida’s statute simply states: “a traffic enforcement
agency may not establish a traffic citation quota.”96 This prohibition
does not define what a quota is or whether it has to be numerically
specific in order to fall under the scope of the statute. Such interpretative tasks are left to courts, assuming that allegations of quotas get
that far.
Utah’s statute, passed in 2018, is a bit more specific. It defines
quotas as “any requirement or minimum standard regarding the
number or percentage of citations or arrests.”97 But this provision still
does not specify whether the prohibited “requirement” or “standard,”
must be formal.
The shortcomings of Utah and Florida’s statutes are representative of the many limitations of anti-quota laws. Most statutes only
cover some aspects of quota-based policing, and each statute is different. What one state considers an illegal quota, another state may
find permissible. Most basically, anti-quota laws vary on how formal
or numerically specific quotas must be to fall under the statute. All
statutes prohibit departments from requiring officers to issue a certain
amount of citations or traffic violations. Some laws go further and
include arrests, while others cover precursory law enforcement activities such as stops and warnings. Most focus on whether the failure to
meet a quota leads to some kind of employment action.
Formality: As Figure 1 demonstrates, state statutes vary in their
language and their characterization of quotas as formal and/or
informal. “Direct” and “indirect” are also words used to capture formality. For example, Nebraska only prohibits law enforcement from
“directly” requiring an officer to meet a quota.98 Informal pressure
put on a police officer to improve their numbers is not covered.
Pennsylvania’s statutory language, by contrast, forbids any law
enforcement agency from establishing or maintaining any policy
“directly or indirectly.”99 Other jurisdictions, like New Jersey, are
silent on which communicative mechanisms are forbidden and state
that law enforcement may not “establish any quota for arrests or cita-

96
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FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.640 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 184 of 2020 2d Reg. Sess.).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-27 (West, Westlaw through 2020 6th Spec. Sess.) (emphasis
added).
98 NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-235 (West, Westlaw through end of 2020 2d Reg. Sess.).
99 71 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2001 (West 2020).
97
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tions.”100 This might include direct or indirect quotas, or encapsulate
only formal quotas. Since many of these statutes are under-litigated,
the available language is crucial for parties seeking to bring a claim
that an agency violated the prohibition.
FIGURE 1. FORMALITY

Silent
No language on level
of formality
(e.g., New Jersey)

AND

QUOTA STATUTES

Formality
Prohibits only direct
or formal impositions
of quotas
(e.g., Nebraska)

Informality
Prohibits
informal/indirect
quota requirements
and formal and direct
requirements
(e.g., Pennsylvania)

Quantification: Numerical requirements are also present in some
state prohibitions. Michigan’s statute is typical in that it bars agencies
from requiring a “predetermined or specified number of citations.”101
Some states, like Florida, do not make any reference to numbers,
which could simply mean that a number is implied in the definition of
quota but could also leave room for the use of averages, which some
departments use to circumvent quota prohibitions.102

Generic
(Prohibits implementation of
quotas; no statutory definition
of amount; e.g., Florida)

AND

QUOTA STATUTES

Numerically Specific
(Prohibits requiring a specific
average or number of
citations/violations or arrests;
e.g., New York)

Law Enforcement Activity: All statutes specify which law enforcement activities cannot be subject to a quota. Seventeen states prohibit
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:14-181.2 (West, Westlaw through L.2020, c.136 and J.R. No.

101 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.750 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 2020, No. 256 of
2020 Reg. Sess.).
102 See Sparrow, supra note 34.
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quotas for citations and traffic violations.103 Nine states include citations, traffic violations, and arrests.104 Other states are overinclusive
or underinclusive when it comes to activity outside of citations, traffic
violations, and arrests. Two states, Wisconsin and Rhode Island,
include warning notices and investigative stops, respectively.105 These
states seem to recognize that warnings and stops can lead to the kind
of law enforcement activity that quota legislation is designed to cover,
and accordingly include these preludes into their statutory schemes.
Some jurisdictions take the opposite approach. Missouri excludes
warnings from its statute,106 whereas South Carolina and Illinois make
exceptions for “points of contact.”107 In these three jurisdictions, such
precursory activity does not fall under the state statute. All other
states are silent on whether these kinds of law enforcement activities
are covered by their statutes. Thus, read in whole, American statutes
that prohibit quotas focus primarily on citations, traffic violations, and
arrests, leaving significant room for penumbral pursuits that are
related but do not fall into those specific law enforcement activities.
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103 These states include Connecticut, Illinois, Florida, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Wisconsin.
104 Arkansas, California, Louisiana, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
Rhode Island, and Utah all include citations, tickets, and arrests.
105 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 349.025 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Act 186); 31 R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 31-27-25 (West, Westlaw through ch. 79 of 2020 2d Reg. Sess.).
106 MO. ANN. STAT. § 304.125 (West, Westlaw through 2020 2d Reg. Sess.) (“This
section shall not apply to the issuance of warning citations.”).
107 S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1-245 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Sess.); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 2610/24 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 101-651).

43166-nyu_96-2 Sheet No. 90 Side B

05/11/2021 08:20:10

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\96-2\NYU203.txt

550

unknown

Seq: 22

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

FIGURE 3. LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY

AND

10-MAY-21

15:01

[Vol. 96:529

QUOTA STATUTES

Least Expansive
Citations/Violations; Contacts and
Warnings Specifically Excluded
(e.g., South Carolina)

Citations/Violations only
(e.g., Connecticut)

Citations/Violations;
Arrests (e.g., New Jersey)

Citations/Violations; Arrests; Warnings/
Stops Included (e.g., Wisconsin)

Most Expansive
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108 TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 720.002 (West, Westlaw through end of 2019 Reg. Sess.)
(emphasis added).
109 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 215-a (McKinney, Westlaw through L.2019, ch. 758 and L.2020,
chs. 1 to 387).
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Employment Actions: A few states use specific language prohibiting the use of quotas for incentives and adverse employment actions.
Texas, for example, prohibits the use of quotas to “evaluate, promote,
compensate, or discipline” police officers.108 Some states focus only
on adverse employment actions. New York’s ban, which has been subject to the most litigation, prohibits “a reassignment, a scheduling
change, an adverse evaluation, a constructive dismissal, the denial of a
promotion, or the denial of overtime, based in whole or in part on
such employee’s failure to meet a quota.”109 By specifying the range
of employment actions, these statutes supply potential plaintiffs (typically police officers) with the statutory language to bring claims
against departments that implement quotas. States like Arkansas, by
contrast, are silent on this issue. One could interpret this silence to
mean that employment action is impliedly forbidden by the statute or
as an intentional omission by the legislature.
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FIGURE 4. EMPLOYMENT ACTIONS

AND
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Adverse Employment
Action Only
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(e.g., New York)
Action; e.g., Arkansas)

15:01

QUOTA STATUTES

Employment Benefits
+ Adverse Action
(e.g., Texas)

Additional Features: Two statutes have unique features that are
worth noting. First, Illinois has a provision that attempts to address
potential funding complications that may arise from prohibitions.110
Its statute states that the prohibition on quotas “shall not affect the
conditions of any federal or State grants or funds awarded to the
municipality and used to fund traffic enforcement programs.”111
Second, Tennessee amended its prohibition in July 2020 and made violation of the statute a Class B misdemeanor subject to a fine.112 Since
it is a new amendment, time will tell if this will successfully deter
police brass attempting to implement quotas. The shortcomings of
each of these different types of state quota prohibitions often interface with other legal obstacles and shape litigation outcomes. That will
be the topic of the next Part.

The national patchwork of quota-based statutes has produced a
variegated body of caselaw. Police officers are the typical plaintiffs
that bring these cases to court. They usually argue that their resistance
to or inability to meet a quota led to some adverse employment
action. Alternatively, officers claim that they endured retaliation for
speaking out about quotas—a claim that usually involves First
Amendment issues.
People subject to criminal law enforcement are also common parties in police quota litigation.113 These individuals fall into two catego110

65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-1-12 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 101-651).
Id.
112 Act of July 15, 2020, ch. 801, 2020 Tenn. Pub Acts, https://publications.tnsosfiles.com/
acts/111/pub/pc0801.pdf.
113 There are a handful of cases where governments have brought charges against public
officials who implemented or conformed to quotas, but these are rare. See Becker-Ross v.
State, 595 S.W.3d 261 (Tex. App. 2020); Gerwer v. Kelly, 980 N.Y.S.2d 275 (Sup. Ct. 2013).
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ries. They can be criminal defendants who argue that their contact
with law enforcement was predicated on an officer’s compliance with
an illegal quota system. In essence, these parties raise the practice of
quota-based policing as an affirmative defense. In instances where
alleged quota-based contact resulted in dropped charges or the termination of the criminal action, parties have also brought federal civil
rights lawsuits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.114 In these cases, which sometimes emerge from jurisdictions without anti-quota laws, plaintiffs
argue that law enforcement’s adherence to police quotas led to a violation of their civil rights.
Whether the party challenging the quota is an officer or a civilian,
there are a range of socio-legal, doctrinal, and evidentiary hurdles that
litigants must overcome before courts will meaningfully engage with
their claims. This subsection briefly describes these hurdles for both
groups, then describes the varying outcomes of these cases.
A.

Police Speech and the Blue Code

Police officers are the group most likely and best positioned to
litigate challenges to quotas, but the “code of silence,” which prohibits
officers from reporting misconduct, serves as a barrier.115 This
code116—which commentators also refer to as “the blue wall of
114

42 U.S.C. § 1983.
See, e.g., Isidoro Rodriguez, The Plight of the Police Whistleblower, CRIME REPORT
(June 18, 2020), https://thecrimereport.org/2020/06/18/the-plight-of-the-policewhistleblower (quoting Seth Stoughton, law professor and former police officer, saying
“[t]here is tremendous pressure in policing, a cultural pressure, to not expose fellow
officers to either professional or physical threats”).
116 See SANJA KUTNJAK IVKOVIC, FALLEN BLUE KNIGHTS: CONTROLLING POLICE
CORRUPTION 20 (2005) (describing the code as “the informal prohibition within police
culture of reporting misconduct by fellow officers—binds police together”); see also Bret
D. Asbury, Anti-Snitching Norms and Community Loyalty, 89 OR. L. REV. 1257, 1285–92
(2011) (describing the code as an anti-snitching norm rooted in ideas about group loyalty
and family); David Rudovsky, Police Abuse: Can the Violence Be Contained?, 27 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 465, 487 (1992) (“The code of silence does more than prevent testimony.
It mandates that no officer report another for misconduct, that supervisors not discipline
officers for abuse, that wrongdoing be covered up, and that any investigation or legal
action into police misconduct be deflected and discouraged.”). Courts have also recognized
the code in § 1983 actions. See Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The “Blue Wall of Silence”
as Evidence of Bias and Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. PITT. L.
REV. 233, 239, n.16 (1998) (listing cases). See generally Myriam E. Gilles, Breaking the
Code of Silence: Rediscovering “Custom” in Section 1983 Municipal Liability, 80 B.U. L.
REV. 17, 18 (2000) (exploring the police “code of silence” as an unconstitutional police
practice under § 1983). In the context of quotas, the blue code could be understood in two
ways. First, it could be understood as a prohibition against one officer revealing another
officer’s compliance with an illegal quota (a form of misconduct) to a perceived outsider
(i.e. the public, the media). Alternatively, it could apply to an officer who reveals that law
enforcement leadership is enforcing quotas. At its core, the code is about a brotherhood in
which some police officers might not include management. Put another way, there is an
115
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silence,” “blue cocoon,” “blue shield,” or “blue curtain”117—has been
a problem in American policing for almost a century.118 One police
misconduct attorney explains how a breach of this code can be consequential: “while police officers may feel that a fellow officer has acted
wrongfully, they fear that they will lose their job, or be subject to ridicule, ostracization, and physical reprisals from their comrades if the
truth is told.”119 The same applies to speaking out about quotas. The
case of Adrian Schoolcraft is telling. Schoolcraft worked for the
NYPD and secretly recorded superiors discussing illegal quotas or, as
some officials described it, “paying the rent.”120 Three weeks after he
made misconduct allegations, a dozen officers, led by a deputy chief,
went to his apartment.121 A tape recording of the event revealed that
the deputy chief Mike Marino, who has been described as a devotee of
NYPD’s numbers-driven policing,122 warned Schoolcraft, “they are
going to treat you like an EDP [emotionally disturbed person] . . . .
Now, you have a choice. You get up like a man and put your shoes on
and walk into that bus, or they’re going to treat you as an EDP and

43166-nyu_96-2 Sheet No. 92 Side A
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argument that the blue code is about protecting not police leadership, but rank and file.
But actual instances involving police officers revealing the existence of quotas suggest that
leadership is considered part of the code. See generally Radley Balko, Opinion, The Blue
Wall: Stronger than Ever, WASH. POST (Sept. 4, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/the-watch/wp/2015/09/04/the-blue-wall-stronger-than-ever (describing instances of
police officers who have revealed the existence of quotas and allege retaliation from their
peers and leadership).
117 See Chin & Wells, supra note 116, at 237 n.15 (describing the different terms for the
code).
118 See Craig B. Futterman, Chaclyn Hunt & Jamie Kalven, Youth/Police Encounters on
Chicago’s South Side: Acknowledging the Realities, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 125, 182 (noting
that “over the last eighty-five years, at least nine different commissions around the nation
have identified the police code of silence as a serious problem that prevents
accountability” and listing all of the reports).
119 G. Flint Taylor, A Litigator’s View of Discovery and Proof in Police Misconduct
Policy and Practice Cases, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 747, 758 (1999); see also Aziz Z. Huq &
Richard H. McAdams, Litigating the Blue Wall of Silence: How to Challenge the Police
Privilege to Delay Investigation, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 213, 247–48 (“Scholarship on
policing amply shows that police officers enforce the code of silence with social ostracism,
refusals to answer calls for backup, denials of promotion, reassignments to less desirable
postings, and threats of violence.”).
120 Graham Rayman, The NYPD Tapes: Inside Bed-Stuy’s 81st Precinct, VILLAGE
VOICE (May 4, 2010), https://www.villagevoice.com/2010/05/04/the-nypd-tapes-inside-bedstuys-81st-precinct.
121 See Graham Rayman, NYPD Tapes Update: Queens DA Richard Brown’s Report on
Whistleblower Cop Raises More Questions than It Answers, VILLAGE VOICE (Dec. 13,
2012), https://www.villagevoice.com/2012/12/13/nypd-tapes-update-queens-da-richardbrowns-report-on-whistleblower-cop-raises-more-questions-than-it-answers.
122 See Graham Rayman, Deputy Chief Michael Marino in Stop-and-Frisk Trial: ‘Do
Your Job or Suffer the Consequences,’ VILLAGE VOICE (Mar. 25, 2013), https://
www.villagevoice.com/2013/03/25/deputy-chief-michael-marino-in-stop-and-frisk-trial-doyour-job-or-suffer-the-consequences.
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that means handcuffs.”123 Schoolcraft was subjected to the latter and
forcibly committed to a psychiatric ward.124 After six days in the ward,
he was discharged and suspended and continued to receive visits from
police officers.125 Ultimately, he made the tapes public and sued the
NYPD for retaliation.126 The NYPD settled.127 Since the incident, the
City has not “released one report, document or even scrap of paper
which explains the NYPD’s handling of the episode or details the
department’s conclusions about Schoolcraft’s allegations.”128 While
this is one of the more spectacular examples of what happens when
the code of silence is breached, it highlights its retaliatory nature.129
As some of the cases discussed in this Article show, the threat of retaliation can determine whether quota cases make it to courts and, if
they do, the posture in which they enter the legal system.
The code of silence bleeds into First Amendment issues involving
police speech. The Supreme Court in Garcetti v. Ceballos ruled that
public employees who speak pursuant to their job duties have no First
Amendment protection from retaliation for such speech.130 If an
officer speaks about a quota in their official capacity, then a First
Amendment retaliation claim cannot succeed. The only way such a
claim could prevail is if the officer demonstrates that she spoke as a
citizen and not as an employee. Post-Garcetti, federal district and
appeals courts have rejected retaliation claims brought by police
officers who argued that they were subject to an adverse employment
action due to their complaints about police quotas.131 Considering the
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123 Graham Rayman, NYPD Tapes 4: The WhistleBlower, Adrian Schoolcraft, VILLAGE
VOICE (June 15, 2010), https://www.villagevoice.com/2010/06/15/nypd-tapes-4-thewhistleblower-adrian-schoolcraft.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Goodman, supra note 26.
127 Id.
128 Graham Rayman, Adrian Schoolcraft: The Other NYPD Scandal in the Room,
VILLAGE VOICE (Apr. 20, 2011), https://www.villagevoice.com/2011/04/20/adrianschoolcraft-the-other-nypd-scandal-in-the-room.
129 Roberta Ann Johnson, Whistleblowing and the Police, 3 RUTGERS J.L. & URB. POL’Y
74, 83 (2005) (“The threat of retaliation against whistleblowers has a chilling effect. The
threat prevents officers from coming forward to expose corrupt and abusive practices and
it prevents serious wrongdoing from being addressed in-house.”).
130 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006).
131 See, e.g., Taylor v. Pawlowski, 551 F. App’x 31, 31 (3d Cir. 2013) (ruling that officer’s
statements to his superiors about the illegality of a quota system for traffic stops were not
protected speech under the First Amendment, and that he was acting as a public employee
speaking pursuant to his duties); Cid v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, No. 18-4012, 2019 WL
161495, at *7 (D. Kan. Jan. 9, 2019) (rejecting a First Amendment retaliation claim brought
by a terminated officer because he “directed his speech to his immediate supervisors and
others in his chain of command—but no one outside that chain of command” and did not
make a showing that his speech “involve[d] a matter of public concern and not merely a
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inadequacy of whistleblower laws, which often fail to cover police
officers and impose technical requirements, Garcetti presents a quagmire.132 Officers concerned about quota-based policing in their
departments can keep their objections in-house and follow typical
grievance procedures. However, this process typically requires the
grievant to inform a chain of command (e.g., their immediate supervisor, then chief of police, then the city manager).133 The grievance
process can subject the officer to the hazards of retaliation for
breaking the code of silence, and under Garcetti, the officer may not
be protected. The officer could also go public, as some have recently
done,134 but that option can be similarly, if not more, antagonizing to
colleagues and lead to resignations that are difficult to remediate.135
These social and legal constraints provide some insight into why statutes prohibiting quotas are infrequently litigated.
B.

Evidentiary Challenges for Civilians

Challenges to quota-based policing brought by civilians raise
many of the evidentiary problems discussed in “access to justice”
scholarship. This body of work describes how infidelity to discovery
rules, strict pleading standards, and the judicial hostility to the
enforcement of civil rights make courts inaccessible to civilians.136 As
a threshold matter, discovery disputes can preclude parties from demonstrating that quota-based policing exists. For example, in cases
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personal issue internal to the workplace”); Whitehead v. City of New York, 953 F. Supp. 2d
367, 375 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (“[P]laintiff’s refusal to comply with the quota policy is not
protected by the First Amendment because he confined his opposition to and criticism of
the quota policy within the NYPD and never attempted to communicate his complaints to
the public.”). But see Matthews v. City of New York, 779 F.3d 167, 176 (2d Cir. 2015)
(finding that officer spoke as a citizen when he spoke to his commanding officers about its
arrest policy).
132 Whistleblower laws sometimes lack statutory coverage for municipal and county
employees (categories police officers often fall in) and have various technical requirements
for coverage (e.g., mandated initial disclosure to supervisors for protection to attach). See
Ann C. Hodges & Justin Pugh, Crossing the Thin Blue Line: Protecting Law Enforcement
Officers Who Blow the Whistle, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 1, 26–31 (2018).
133 See LARRY K. GAINES & JOHN L. WORRALL, POLICE ADMINISTRATION 344–45
(2012) (describing grievance procedures).
134 See infra note 330; supra notes 37, 44, 65, 120–29.
135 See Huq & McAdams, supra note 119, at 247–48 (suggesting that harassment that
forces an officer to resign should be understood as a constructive discharge and noting “the
well-known reality is that it remains difficult or impossible to prove constructive discharge
in any individual case, given the code of silence”).
136 See STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: THE
COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION (2017); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CLOSING THE COURTHOUSE DOOR: HOW YOUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS BECAME
UNENFORCEABLE (2017); SARAH STASZAK, NO DAY IN COURT: ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND
THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL RETRENCHMENT (2015).
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involving criminal defendants who were charged with driving while
intoxicated and sought arrest data to prove the existence of police
quotas, some courts have ruled that such information is not relevant
or would not bear any material information.137
Some civil rights plaintiffs have unsuccessfully brought legal
actions arguing that quota-satisfying officers violated their rights. For
example, in D.H. v. City of New York, a group of women of color
were arrested and charged with loitering for the purposes of prostitution.138 They brought a § 1983 suit against the City of New York and
their arresting officers. The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality
of the loitering statute and argued that they were discriminated
against on the basis of their race, gender, and gender identity.139 The
plaintiffs also argued that the arrests were products of quota-based
policing.140 To support their claim, they relied on statistical evidence
and a statement from a former police officer who noted that arrest
quotas led cops to go after “black, . . . Hispanic, . . . [and] LGBT
communit[ies].”141 Notwithstanding this evidence, New York’s antiquota statute,142 and the NYPD’s documented struggles with
quotas,143 the court found their arguments unpersuasive. The court
granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss and ruled that the plaintiffs
had failed to show that “one of these defendants needed to make
these arrests to meet his or her performance goals and arrest quotas,
assuming such goals and quotas existed.”144 By requiring this kind of
evidence at the pleading stage, particularly in a jurisdiction that has
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137 See, e.g., Mayes v. City of Oak Park, No. 05-CV-74386-DT, 2007 WL 9751967, at *1
(E.D. Mich. Sept. 28, 2007), aff’d, 285 F. App’x 261 (6th Cir. 2008) (ruling that the plaintiff,
a former public safety officer who claimed his termination was based on race and disability
discrimination, was not entitled to racial data on arrests and tickets in Oak Park because it
was not relevant to his claim); Page v. State, 7 S.W.3d 202, 206 (Tex. App. 1999) (rejecting
defendant’s request for DWI task force information, which he argued was material and
could be used to impeach the arresting officer since a DWI quota directive would have
given the officer a motive to falsify his report); County of Nassau Police Dep’t v. Judge, 654
N.Y.S.2d 174, 175 (App. Div. 1997) (ruling that motorist was not entitled to production of
internal police directives and orders that allegedly established DWI quota system because
the respondent did not demonstrate that any information would be relevant or
exculpatory).
138 309 F. Supp. 3d 52, 63 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
139 Id. at 64.
140 Id. at 76.
141 Id. at 75.
142 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 215-a (McKinney, Westlaw through L.2019, ch. 758 and L.2020,
chs. 1 to 387).
143 See Bronstein, supra note 21 (arguing that the New York anti-quota statute has
largely failed to rectify the negative practices of the NYPD).
144 D.H., 309 F. Supp. 3d at 76 (emphasis added).
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C.

Wins and Losses

Challenges to quotas that get beyond these hurdles have had
mixed success. This subsection describes the few wins that plaintiffs
have achieved when litigating police quotas, as well as the many
losses.
145
146
147
148
150
151
152
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149

Wynn v. City of Pulaski, No. 11-0025, 2013 WL 527154 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 11, 2013).
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *13.
Id.
Id.
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been the poster-child for police quotas, the court created a high bar
for future civil rights plaintiffs seeking to challenge this practice.
Many of the same problems arise in federal cases out of jurisdictions that do not have quota legislation. Before Tennessee passed its
legislation, a federal court in that state heard a case brought by Terry
Wynn, a Black physician who was stopped by the police after speeding
to a hospital to help deliver a patient’s baby.145 Despite the intervention of a hospital supervisor who came to the hospital parking lot to
inform the arresting officer that Wynn was indeed a doctor, the officer
prepared a criminal summons against Wynn for speeding, felony
evading arrest, resisting arrest, and a host of other violations.146 A
local prosecutor dropped the charges.147 Meanwhile, the officer was
suspended for a month for what the police chief described as a failure
of judgement.148 Wynn brought a § 1983 suit, arguing that the officer
and the City had violated her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights.149 She argued that the City of Pulaski had a quota that required
law enforcement to obtain “10 ‘traffic or custodial arrests’ per month
as a work performance goal,” citing the arresting officer’s own testimony as evidence.150 The court ruled that this testimony was not
indicative of a “hard-and-fast policy of the department.”151 If it was a
formal policy, the court added, “municipal liability cannot attach in
the absence of showing some link between the quota and the allegedly
false arrest of, and use of excessive force on, Dr. Wynn.”152 Ultimately, in the federal tribunals where non-officers bring their challenges to quotas, courts demand tight causal links between the alleged
quota and the constitutional violation. These evidentiary demands,
along with different statutory conceptions of quotas, have likely
stunted the development of case law in this area.
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153 See, e.g., Woolston v. Cutting, 474 A.2d 698, 701 (Pa. 1984) (holding that in authoring
the anti-quota statute, the legislature intended it to function as an affirmative defense
rather than a civil cause of action).
154 Commonwealth v. Greene, 32 Pa. D. & C.3d 48, 52–53 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1984).
155 Id. at 53–54.
156 Alexander v. State, 949 S.W.2d 772, 773–74 (Tex. App. 1997).
157 Id. at 775. But see Hollier v. State, No. 14-99-01348-CR, 2001 WL 951014, at *7 (Tex.
App. Aug. 23, 2001) (rejecting a similar claim because, unlike in Alexander, the appellant
could not show that the arresting officer was operating under a quota at the time of arrest).
158 See State v. Sampia, 696 So. 2d 618, 620 (La. Ct. App. 1997).
159 See, e.g., Begg v. Moffitt, 555 F. Supp. 1344, 1365 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (finding a violation
under the First Amendment); Ruhlman v. Barger, 435 F. Supp. 447, 450 (W.D. Pa. 1976)
(same).
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Some criminal defendants have persuaded appellate tribunals
that quotas governed their arrests and were not adequately considered
by trial courts. In Pennsylvania, for example, various courts have
interpreted the state’s anti-quota law as creating an affirmative
defense if defendants can prove a violation of the statute by a preponderance of the evidence.153 In Commonwealth v. Greene, a
Pennsylvania court reversed a speeding conviction after the defendant
produced a memo from a sergeant to patrol supervisors imploring
them to increase their citations from 168 to 450 a month and insisting
that they “get the numbers up.”154 The court ruled that the defendant
met his burden, and interpreted the memo as creating an impermissible quota.155
A Texas appeals court came to a similar conclusion, reversing the
DWI conviction of a defendant who was precluded from crossexamining the arresting officer about a departmental quota for DWI
arrests, even though the officer was the state’s sole witness and had
testified that a quota existed.156 The appellate court ruled that the trial
court had abused its discretion and deprived the appellant of his Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation.157 A cross-examination that
revealed the existence of a DWI quota would also play a role in a
Louisiana court’s decision to vacate a conviction.158
Police officers who exposed the existence of quotas have also successfully brought retaliation claims against police departments. These
decisions were not per se challenges to the alleged quota system, but
they remain important because they contribute to the small body of
litigation that addresses quotas, shed light on the existence of the
practice, and demonstrate the stakes for police officers who complain
about this kind of policing. Many of these challenges were First
Amendment retaliation cases, decided before Garcetti ruled out
employee claims of retaliation for things they said while on duty.159
Other cases, decided before and after Garcetti, did not hinge on First
Amendment claims, and involved officer complaints about quotas and
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police misconduct. Two are noteworthy. Iglesias v. City of Hialeah, the
more modest and recent of the two, took place in a small city outside
of Miami.160 Juan Iglesias, an officer in the City’s police department,161 sent letters to the City’s police chief and mayor protesting the
enforcement of illegal ticket quotas.162 Nevertheless, he received multiple disciplinary notices for not meeting traffic enforcement standards.163 He used the state’s whistleblower law to argue that the City
had illegally retaliated against him for complaining about the
quotas.164 The trial court awarded him lost wages but precluded him
from seeking noneconomic damages—a decision that the appellate
court reversed.165
Martinez v. Village of Mount Prospect is the most noteworthy
court victory involving a police challenge to a quota.166 The case
involved a Latinx police trainee, Martinez, who brought a national
origin employment discrimination claim against the Village of Mount
Prospect, a community outside of Chicago.167 He argued that police
leadership directed officers to target Latinx drivers to meet ticket
quota requirements; to support his claim, he presented evidence highlighting the disproportionate number of traffic tickets given to Latinx
drivers.168 A federal district court entered an approximately $1.1 million settlement for Martinez169 and enjoined the Village from
“directing, suggesting, ordering or otherwise communicating that any
police officer should focus, concentrate, target, profile, or otherwise
modify law enforcement efforts in any way on the sole basis of the
national origin of any person.”170 Finally, the presiding judge sent a
letter, included in the opinion, to the Department of Justice.171 The
43166-nyu_96-2 Sheet No. 95 Side A
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160 Iglesias v. City of Hialeah, No. 3D18-639, 2019 WL 3309040 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. July
24, 2019).
161 Id. at *1.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id. at *2. This dispute spawned a separate ongoing case involving Iglesias’s sergeant,
Paul DiPietro. In his testimony for Iglesias’s case, DiPietro was reprimanded for failing to
adequately discipline Iglesias, and then in Iglesias’s civil suit, gave testimony that
contradicted the City’s position that there was no traffic quota. He argued that he was
retaliated against by reassignment to a far location and then terminated. DiPietro brought
his own claim into federal court, which the parties settled in 2020. See Joint Stipulation for
Dismissal With Prejudice at 1, DiPietro v. City of Hialeah, No. 19-cv-23212 (S.D. Fla. Sept.
10, 2020), ECF No. 50.
166 92 F. Supp. 2d 780 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
167 Id. at 781.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id. at 782.
171 Id.
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letter highlighted the interface of the quota policy and racial profiling
and encouraged the agency to investigate the Village for civil rights
violations.172
Martinez represents one of the more significant rulings on police
quotas, but when cases are decided on the merits, it is much more
common for plaintiffs to lose. Judicial rebuffs come in a variety of
forms. Sometimes courts, relying on Garcetti, rule that officer objections to police quotas do not constitute protected speech, which often
ends the analysis.173 Sometimes courts are unpersuaded by evidence
that points to the existence of quotas.174 Sometimes the claims are
outright unpersuasive, as in Gravitte v. N.C. Division of Motor
Vehicles,175 where the Fourth Circuit rejected claims brought by a
police officer and a police union who argued that North Carolina’s
quota policy violated officers’ right to equal protection because the
policy operated in some districts but not others.176
Two litigation losses are particularly instructive for thinking
about quota-based policing in the future. Both cases, brought by
police unions, reveal how departments and jurisdictions can work
around statutory prohibitions. The first concerns Camden, New
Jersey, which has been at the center of police reform for its drastic
reboot of its police department.177 In Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge
1 v. City of Camden, the Fraternal Order of Police challenged the
City’s implementation of a “directed patrol” program that required
172

Id.
See, e.g., Whitehead v. City of New York, 953 F. Supp. 2d 367, 375 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)
(holding that the plaintiff officer’s objections to the quota were not protected by the First
Amendment because refusing to comply with the quota does not constitute expressive
conduct).
174 See, e.g., Statewide Univ. Police Ass’n v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univ., B290293,
2020 WL 2213040, at *5–6 (Cal. Ct. App. May 7, 2020) (finding no violation of the state’s
quota statute where personal evaluation “comment cards” offering feedback on the lack of
parking enforcement citations were not punitive in nature); Oliverio v. Butler Univ., No.
15-cv-01630, 2017 WL 1650501, at *9 (S.D. Ind. May 2, 2017) (rejecting plaintiff’s
invocation of the respondent’s quota requirement for parking tickets as not relevant
because he was arrested for battery); Matarazzo v. Safir, 689 N.Y.S.2d 494, 495 (App. Div.
1999) (dismissing claim because petitioners gave no indication of how many tickets
petitioners had to write and the only evidence offered was from two supervising officers
from two different precincts who directed the individual petitioners to perform duties,
during their meal breaks, that were likely to result in the issuance of tickets);
Commonwealth v. McClellan, 45 Pa. D. & C.3d 627, 628 (C.P. Chester 1987) (rejecting
defendant’s affirmative quota defense because he only offered budget statements that
showed projected revenues, which the court argued did not establish the existence of a
quota system).
175 33 F. App’x 45, 47 (4th Cir. 2002).
176 The plaintiffs also raised relatively unpersuasive claims under the Due Process
clause, the Privileges and Immunities clause, and the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 47, 49.
177 See Fussell, supra note 31.
173
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842 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 2016).
Id.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 237.
183 Id. at 239.
184 Phillipsburg Policemen’s Benevolent Ass’n Local No. 56 v. Twp. of Phillipsburg, A5016-12T3, 2014 WL 8765463, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 5, 2015).
179
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police officers to “engage” people whether or not they were suspected
of wrongdoing.178 The directed patrol program consisted of “a structured 15–20 minute deployment into a targeted area to accomplish a
specific patrol or crime reduction function.”179 The contacts were to
be tracked and recorded, and officers on regular patrol were expected
to perform a minimum of eighteen contacts.180 According to plaintiffs,
failure to comply with these numerical requirements was cause for disciplinary action.181 The City argued that the program was not a quota
because it required police-civilian interactions and not arrests or citations.182 The Third Circuit relied on the text of the statute and, in a
short analysis, agreed.183 Fraternal Order is a paradigmatic example of
how a police department can circumvent a statutory prohibition on
quotas by focusing on precursory activity such as stops and contacts.
Another failed litigation challenge highlights the sophisticated
ways through which police departments can subvert quota statutes. In
Phillipsburg Policemen’s Benevolent Ass’n Local No. 56 v. Township
of Phillipsburg, a local police union challenged a township’s “selfdirected patrol index policy,” which created a point system to evaluate
police officers.184 The index assigned different values to different
kinds of arrests and citations:
• 4 Points - Narcotics arrests (4 points per subject arrested)
• 4 Points - Burglary and theft arrests
• 3 Points - Warrant arrests (1 subject, multiple warrants = 3
points)
• 2 Points - All moving motor vehicle summonses
• 2 Points - Quality of life summonses (e.g., excessive noise,
alcohol related offenses, and animal offenses)
• 2 Points - Other arrests (e.g., disorderly conduct, domestic violence offense; 2 points per subject)
• 2 Points - Unsecured business found (report completed)
• 1 Point - All other town ordinance violations
• 1 Point - Hazardous conditions reported (report must be completed for incident)
• 1 Point - All parking tickets
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•

1/2 Point - For every two individual community policing contacts per tour of duty (4 contacts = 2 points, 6 contacts = 3
points, etc.)185
Officers who received an index of two or more points received an
exceptional performance evaluation.186 The union argued that the
policy undermined the state’s prohibition on quotas, and the trial
court agreed.187
The appellate court struggled because the statute’s language only
prohibited traffic violations and arrests and, according to the
Township, officers could achieve an excellent evaluation without
resorting to either.188 The court acknowledged that the policy “does
not, on its face, require quotas” but went on to find that the “defendants cannot avoid the statutory prohibition by crafting a carefully
worded policy that does not, when read literally, violate a statutory
mandate, but does so when implemented.”189 It added, “if it looks like
a duck, quacks like a duck, then it probably is a duck.”190 Notwithstanding the court’s acknowledgment of possible subterfuge, it
reversed the trial court’s conclusion that the policy constituted an
illegal quota.191 As I explain in more detail in Part IV, decisions like
Fraternal Order and Phillipsburg are more than simple losses for
police unions. They demonstrate how quota statutes can be evaded in
ways that harm the public and frustrate efforts to reign in police
malfeasance.
D.

Settlements

185
186
187
189
190
191
192
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188

Id.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *4.
See supra note 26.
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Social norms, legal hurdles, and an unfavorable jurisprudential
landscape are features of quota litigation, but so are settlements. Government settlements with officers and civilians have touched various
parts of the country—from small cities to big cities—and have ranged
from five-figure to eight-figure payouts.192 Though settlements often
come with the qualification that they are not admissions of guilt, they
provide a provisional glimpse behind the “blue wall” that quotas
sometimes operate behind. Settlements typically come after courts
reject motions by governments to dispense with litigation, leaving a
body of law that may be useful for future challenges. At a bare min-
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imum, settlements reveal how much a jurisdiction wants to avoid litigating their public insistence that they do not use quotas.
New York City, the jurisdiction with the country’s largest police
force,193 has struggled with quota allegations and doled out the most
in settlements. Adrian Schoolcraft—the involuntarily committed
officer discussed above—survived a motion for summary judgment
after a federal judge ruled that his speech was protected because he
spoke as a citizen. Shortly thereafter, the City of New York settled
with Schoolcraft for $600,000.194 That same year, the City settled with
Craig Matthews, an NYPD officer who complained that his Bronx
precinct had competitions for who could make the most arrests, conduct the most stop-and-frisks, and issue the most summonses.195 The
Second Circuit ruled that Matthews’s speech was protected by the
First Amendment and the City subsequently settled with Matthews
for $280,000 to avoid further litigation.196
A little less than a year later, after a federal judge certified a class
of defendants subject to quota-based policing and subsequently
imposed sanctions on the NYPD for destroying relevant evidence, the
City of New York settled with the class for $75 million.197 Under the
settlement, the City agreed to reiterate its policy that quotas were
illegal and that supervisors who implemented them could be subject to
discipline.198 In Floyd v. City of New York, the famous “stop and
frisk” decision, quotas were a significant theme.199
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193 SHELLEY S. HYLAND & ELIZABETH DAVIS, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., LOCAL POLICE
DEPARTMENTS, 2016: PERSONNEL 3 (2019), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd16p.pdf
(noting that in 2016, New York City had the largest local police department with more than
three times the number of employees than any other department).
194 Goodman, supra note 26.
195 Matthews v. City of New York, 779 F.3d 167, 169 (2d Cir. 2015); see also Christopher
Mathias, NYC to Pay $280,000 Over Cop Who Exposed City’s Quota System, HUFFPOST
(Dec. 7, 2015, 3:48 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/craig-matthews-nypdquotas_n_5665cab8e4b072e9d1c6d86b.
196 Mathias, supra note 195.
197 See Stinson v. City of New York, No. 10 Civ. 4228, 2016 WL 54684, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 5, 2016) (describing how the City failed to issue a litigation hold until three years after
the complaint was filed, maintained a policy that provided for the destruction of evidence,
destroyed materials related to CompStat meetings, destroyed activity reports, failed to
preserve text messages, produced few responsive documents, was “grossly negligent,” and
acted in “bad faith”); Benjamin Weiser, New York City to Pay Up to $75 Million Over
Dismissed Summonses, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/23/
nyregion/new-york-city-agrees-to-settlement-over-summonses-that-were-dismissed.html.
198 Weiser, supra note 197.
199 Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 596–602 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (analyzing
the pressure that quotas impart on officers to increase their stop numbers); see also Jenn
Rolnick Borchetta, Continuing to Reform the NYPD’s Stop and Frisk Practice, DEMOS
(Feb. 16, 2016), https://www.demos.org/blog/continuing-reform-nypds-stop-and-friskpractice (noting the NYPD norm of officers being judged “on how many stops they do”).
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200 Joel Rubin & Catherine Saillant, LAPD to Pay $10 Million in Traffic Ticket Quota
Controversy, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2013, 12:00 AM), https://articles.latimes.com/2013/dec/
10/local/la-me-ln-ticket-quota-20131210.
201 Id.
202 Special Verdict, Chan v. City of Los Angeles, No. BC 418750 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr.
11, 2011); Andrew Blankstein & Joel Rubin, LAPD Officers Who Complained About
Ticket Quotas Are Awarded $2 Million, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2011, 12:00 AM), https://
www.latimes.com/local/la-xpm-2011-apr-12-la-me-ticket-quotas-20110412-story.html.
203 Rubin & Saillant, supra note 200.
204 Branson-Potts & Reyes, supra note 26.
205 Sprague, supra note 26; see also Rivera v. City of Whittier, No. BC574443, 2017 WL
3579659, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 7, 2017) (evaluating the six plaintiffs’ claims that they
had been retaliated against for whistleblowing the existence of an illegal quota).
206 Meg O’Connor, Inside ‘The Stop-and-Frisk Capital of America,’ APPEAL (Feb. 21,
2019), https://theappeal.org/inside-the-stop-and-frisk-capital-of-america.
207 Id.
208 Sampson v. City of Miami Gardens, No. 13-CV-24312, 2015 WL 11202372, at *1
(S.D. Fla. May 27, 2015).
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On the other side of the country, the City of Los Angeles has
paid millions in settlements to police officers who claim that the Los
Angeles Police Department (LAPD) illegally required them to
comply with ticket quotas. All of the settlements derive from allegations that Captain Nancy Lauer ordered officers to write at least
eighteen traffic tickets each shift and required that eighty percent of
citations be for major violations.200 Officers who did not comply
would be denied overtime or receive undesirable work assignments.201
Despite the City’s claim that the number was a goal and not a mandate, a jury awarded two officers over $1 million in damages.202 Two
years later, the City agreed to pay a settlement of almost $6 million to
eleven police officers in a separate lawsuit over the same quota
system.203 In 2016, the City paid $950,000 to a former officer who also
claimed that he was retaliated against for not participating in a ticket
quota system.204 Most recently, the City of Whittier, located in Los
Angeles County, settled for $3 million with six officers who refused to
participate in an arrest quota scheme.205
Miami Gardens, which has the largest Black population in
Florida and has been called the “stop-and-frisk capital of America,”206
has produced two settlements tied to quota-based policing. The first
involved Earl Sampson, a Black man who was stopped more than four
hundred times between 2008 and 2013, often for trespassing at his
place of work.207 Sampson led a class of Black and Latinx defendants
who sued the City of Miami Gardens, arguing that the City’s police
department violated their constitutional rights by adhering to a racialized system of quota-based policing that led officers to selectively stop
and frisk Black males ages fifteen to thirty.208 A few weeks after a
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209 See Order and Notice of Settlement, Sampson v. City of Miami Gardens, No. 13-CV24312 (S.D. Fla. June 23, 2015), ECF No. 228.
210 See Charles Rabin, She Was Fired After Speaking Out About Bad Arrests. She Sued
and Just Won $1 Million, MIAMI HERALD (Dec. 4, 2018, 6:01 PM), https://
www.miamiherald.com/news/local/crime/article222442315.html.
211 Heather Dunhill, Retired Crime Analyst Wanda F. Gilbert on Police Reform and
Growing Up in Segregated South Florida, SARASOTA MAG. (Aug. 17, 2020, 11:42 AM),
https://www.sarasotamagazine.com/news-and-profiles/2020/08/wanda-f-gilbert.
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 Rabin, supra note 210.
215 Radley Balko, The Militarization of America’s Police Forces, 11 CATO’S LETTER 1,
1–2 (2013).
216 Ted Conover, A Snitch’s Dilemma, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 29, 2012), https://
www.nytimes.com/2012/07/01/magazine/alex-white-professional-snitch.html.
217 Id.
218 Id.
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federal court declined a motion for summary judgment on those
issues, the City settled with the plaintiffs for an undisclosed amount.209
During the litigation and subsequent settlement, a dispute about
the use of quotas took place inside the police department. Wanda
Gilbert, a Black crime analyst responsible for the police department’s
statistics, grew concerned about dubious arrests and quota-based
policing that she claimed were tied to five percent yearly raises.210 She
corroborated the testimony in the Sampson litigation and claimed that
the Black police chief, Matthew Boyd, directed officers “to stop all
Black males between the ages of 15 and 30 years old.”211 She also
described how “boys as young as seven,” and adolescents “riding their
bikes home from school” were accosted by police.212 Gilbert wrote
multiple memos to Boyd and met with City administrators, who told
her not to put her concerns in writing because they would become
public record.213 She was fired after she wrote a final memo in 2011
protesting the department’s practices. After Gilbert’s own protracted
legal battles, which made their way to the Eleventh Circuit, the City
settled with her for approximately $1 million.214
Quota-based policing can also be fatal, as was the case in Atlanta
when police officers killed an elderly woman during an illegal raid of
her home. Officers in the Atlanta Police Department’s narcotics unit,
operating under a quota, pulled a gun on a man they had previously
arrested, planted marijuana on him, and demanded that he tell them
where they could find drugs.215 He made up an address, which happened to be the residence of ninety-two-year-old Kathryn Johnston
and had a wheelchair ramp in the front.216 The officers made false
statements to a magistrate judge to secure a no-knock search warrant.217 They could not kick down the security gate, so they used a pry
bar and a battering ram during the nighttime raid.218 Johnston lived
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alone in a dangerous neighborhood, where an elderly neighbor was
recently raped.219 She fired one shot, which provoked 39 shots by the
officers, some of which ultimately killed her.220 After the shooting, the
officers searched the home, found no drugs, and subsequently planted
three bags of marijuana they had seized earlier that day in Johnston’s
basement.221 Afterward, the officers conspired to fabricate a story that
they then shared with homicide investigators.222 An FBI investigation
found that the narcotics unit had a performance quota of nine arrests
per month.223 In her sentencing of the three officers, U.S. District
Judge Julie Carnes concluded that the pressure to adhere to the
quotas played a role in the killing.224 The City of Atlanta ultimately
awarded a $4.9 million settlement to the family of Kathryn
Johnston.225
It would be a mistake to understand quota settlements as a big
city phenomenon. Some of these settlements have surfaced in small
towns across the country. Local governments have settled cases
involving allegations of quota-based policing in the City of Mendham
in central New Jersey,226 Smyrna, Delaware,227 Lehighton,
Pennsylvania,228 Novi, Michigan,229 Byrnes Mills, Missouri,230 and the
central California city of Paso Robles.231 Financially, law professors
Joanna Schwartz and John Rappaport have explained how these kinds
219

Id.
Id.
221 Third Atlanta Police Officer Pleads Guilty in Fatal Shooting of Elderly Woman,
DEPT. OF JUST. (Oct. 30, 2008), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/October/08crt-972.html.
222 Id.
223 Bill Rankin, Ex-Cops Get 5–10 Years for Drug Raid – Judge Agrees Atlanta Police
Quotas Influenced Officers’ Behavior, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 25, 2009, at C1.
224 Id.
225 Ernie Suggs, City to Pay Slain Woman’s Family $4.9 Million, ATLANTA J.-CONST.
(Aug. 11, 2012), https://www.ajc.com/news/local/city-pay-slain-woman-family-million/
GWqsgDArzmOhvpb7iPY6FI.
226 See Wright, supra note 26.
227 ACLU Reaches Settlement with Smyrna Police over Wrongful Arrests, ACLU (Feb.
19, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/aclu-reaches-settlement-smyrna-police-overwrongful-arrests.
228 See Hall, supra note 49.
229 See Phillips, supra note 26.
230 See Robert Patrick & Jeremy Kohler, Former Byrnes Mill Police Chief Stole $12,800
from Suspects, Feds Say, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Apr. 20, 2017), https://
www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/former-byrnes-mill-police-chief-stole-fromsuspects-feds-say/article_faa278bd-25ef-5a8d-953a-534bc11f62c0.html.
231 See Scott Brennan, City Pays $125,000 to Settle Lawsuit over Ticket Quotas, PASO
ROBLES DAILY NEWS (Mar. 24, 2014, 8:23 PM), https://pasoroblesdailynews.com/city-pays125000-settle-lawsuit-ticket-quotas/15896.
220
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of settlements can be consequential for smaller jurisdictions.232
Socially, such settlements—which circulate in mainstream media outlets as well as in local papers of the day—can lead to the kinds of
distrust in police that exists in bigger cities. The crucial difference is
that many of these localities are not freighted by the same racial
politics of large urban cities.233 The geographical diversity of these settlements highlights how disputes about quota-based policing impact
not only racial minorities—the presumed subjects of mass incarceration—but a broader and unassuming public.
Overall, one can glean a few themes from the legal challenges to
police quotas discussed in this Part. First, many hurdles preclude these
cases from being meaningfully heard by courts. Some obstacles reflect
the general “closing of the courthouse doors” to civil rights litigants
and criminal defendants.234 Other impediments, like the code of
silence, are specific to police culture and jurisprudence. Second, cases
that do make it to a trial on the merits are still unlikely to win. Third,
and relatedly, quota litigation is especially likely to settle. Settlements
sit alongside victories, allegations, memoirs, police recordings, and
criminological scholarship that all point to the existence of police
quotas. With the definitional, statutory, and jurisprudential landscape
sketched out, the Article will now turn to consider policy considerations both for and against the practice of police quotas.
III
THE THEORETICAL CONTOURS

OF

POLICE QUOTAS
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232 See John Rappaport, How Private Insurers Regulate Public Police, 130 HARV. L.
REV. 1539, 1565–66 (2017) (describing how large municipalities have “broad tax bases and
big budgets” that allow them “to absorb the shock of large judgments and settlements that
might seriously damage a smaller city”); see also Joanna C. Schwartz, How Governments
Pay: Lawsuits, Budgets, and Police Reform, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144, 1174 (2016) (“Smaller
jurisdictions will presumably feel the financial effects of lawsuits more acutely.”).
233 See KIM PARKER ET AL., PEW RSCH. CTR., WHAT UNITES AND DIVIDES URBAN,
SUBURBAN, AND RURAL COMMUNITIES 4 (2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/socialtrends/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2018/05/Pew-Research-Center-Community-Type-FullReport-FINAL.pdf (describing the racial makeup and attitudes across different types of
geographical communities).
234 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 136 (describing how the Supreme Court’s decisions
have resulted in restricted access to the courts for those hoping to enforce their
constitutional rights).
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Most observers of the criminal justice system typically understand
quotas through a pejorative lens. In scholarly literature, robust
defenses of quotas are relatively rare. The closest thing to a defense is
the claim by criminology scholars and law enforcement officials that
police need to be evaluated and monitored in some way. This Part
begins by considering the best possible rationales for why quotas
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might be desirable and defensible. Despite the normative position this
Article adopts, it is analytically unsatisfying to oppose police quotas
without confronting possible arguments.
Although some of the arguments in favor of quotas are weighty,
Section III.B contends there are more compelling reasons on the side
of prohibiting them. This Section builds on arguments that have been
raised by opponents by offering a more comprehensive view of why
quotas constitute bad policy. Moreover, it situates these objections
within the definitional, statutory, and jurisprudential context
described in Parts I and II. In doing so, Section III.B lays the groundwork for Part IV’s normative claims.
A.

Defenses

There are at least four possible defenses of quotas that surface in
criminology, in the media, and in public statements made by law
enforcement officials. The first is that quotas protect against police
shirking and idleness. The second is that quotas make the police more
productive (e.g., through “performance targets,” “goals,” “expectations”). Both of these defenses assume that there is a specific amount
of illegal activity occurring in the world, and that officers should
respond to some portion of it. The third defense involves the evaluative utility of quotas and maintains that quotas provide an ostensibly
neutral way to assess police performance. The final defense of quotas
is rare and accepts the profit-generating nature of policing.
1.

Police Idleness

05/11/2021 08:20:10

235 Eric W. Orts, Shirking and Sharking: A Legal Theory of the Firm, 16 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 265, 276–77 (1998).
236 Id.
237 See generally JOHN BREHM & SCOTT GATES, WORKING, SHIRKING, AND SABOTAGE:
BUREAUCRATIC RESPONSE TO A DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC (1997) (studying shirking in federal,
state, and local bureaucracies in order to debunk the concept of the “lazy bureaucrat”).
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The cultural stereotype of lazy, underactive police officers is tied
to a longstanding anxiety about police productivity. Concerns about
shirking invoke basic agency theory where police officers act as agents
for the principal. It is assumed that police officer-agents, “will shirk
their responsibilities when given half a chance.”235 If they are not “sufficiently monitored or bonded, agents will be lazy or irresponsible—or
at least not entirely selfless in their motivations.”236 Quotas are an
attempt to reduce the agency costs that come with police administration. Although concerns about shirking exist across many organizations,237 these worries have unique expressions in policing. In 1909,
Leonhard Fuld, one of the earliest scholars of American urban
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policing, observed that “the policeman’s life is a lazy life . . . as much
of his time is spent doing nothing.”238 Fuld also noted that police are
different because “[t]he authority with which they are invested . . .
create in them an inordinate desire to shirk their work or, as they
themselves express it, ‘to take it easy.’ ”239 NYPD spokesman Al
O’Leary captured this sentiment in the 1990s. When six transit cops
donned nooses at a news conference to protest their “bondage” to
quotas, O’Leary lambasted: “If the union is suggesting we should go
back to the days of coffee-drinking, doughnut eating, do-nothing cops,
then they’re way out of sync with policing today.”240
Most defenses of quotas reject the formal label but embrace the
idea of evaluating officers because of a concern about laziness. When
Atlanta Police Chief Richard Pennington rejected the idea that his
department utilized quotas, he conceded to maintaining a related
euphemism and admitted, “Yes, we have performance measures in the
Atlanta Police Department. We have to have performance measures
because if we don’t have them, the officers would come in every day
with nothing on their sheets.”241 Departments certainly cannot eliminate shirking, but quotas can address this concern by demanding a
minimum amount of law enforcement activity while utilizing employment sanctions to ensure compliance. Considering the significant
amount of money spent on policing,242 it is reasonable to expect some
minimum output level, whether in the seemingly mundane realm of
traffic enforcement or the more serious world of arrests.243
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238 LEONHARD FELIX FULD, POLICE ADMINISTRATION: A CRITICAL STUDY OF POLICE
ORGANISATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES AND ABROAD 91 (2d ed. 1910).
239 Id. at 48–49.
240 Dean Chang, Tix Quota No Token Rule: TA Cops, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 17, 1992,
at 15.
241 Brenda Goodman, Atlanta’s Mayor Defends Chief Against Misconduct Accusations,
N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/01/us/01atlanta.html.
242 See Niall McCarthy, How Much Are U.S. Cities Spending on Policing in 2020?,
FORBES (June 12, 2020, 5:21 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2020/06/12/
how-much-are-us-cities-spending-on-policing-in-2020-infographic (stating that police
budgets run as high as billions of dollars in several major cities in the United States,
including New York ($5.61 billion), Los Angeles ($1.73 billion), and Chicago ($1.68
billion)).
243 See generally CHARLES R. EPP, STEVEN MAYNARD-MOODY & DONALD P. HAIDERMARKEL, PULLED OVER: HOW POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE AND CITIZENSHIP (2014)
(describing the impact of police stops on racial disparities and perceptions of citizenship in
the United States); Anna Roberts, Arrests as Guilt, 70 ALA. L. REV. 987 (2019) (examining
the consequences of arrests and the implicit fusion of arrests and guilt); Rachel A.
Harmon, Why Arrest?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 307 (2016) (arguing against the outsized role
arrests play in policing); Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809 (2015)
(examining how arrests are systematically used as a regulatory tool outside of the criminal
justice system).
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2. Productivity
Ensuring sufficient police activity is another rationale for
quotas.244 While related to idleness, this defense is premised on the
idea that there is a certain amount of illegal activity in the world (i.e.,
traffic violations or criminal offenses) and that officers should attend
to some portion of it.245 Lieutenant Colonel Kelly of Chesterfield
County, located outside of Richmond, Virginia, captured this sentiment when he stated, “Our officers are on the road 12 hours a day, so,
if in a 12-hour period of time they stop three cars, I don’t think that’s
unfairly targeting our citizens.”246 Productivity rationales also ostensibly ensure the fair distribution of work within a police force.247 An
officer in Georgia recently recounted how one of his colleagues
refused to answer calls or provide backup to other officers, and
admitted that the department would “need a quota system to get a
guy like that moving or he’d just park his car and sleep.”248
To make this productivity rationale more concrete, consider the
case of drunk driving. Although Americans generally agree that
driving while drunk is wrong and dangerous, many still tolerate it.249
Setting aside real and often consequential issues of implementation,250
as a general matter, one might argue that the careful dedication of
police resources to drunk driving is uncontroversial. It would also be
244

See Bronstein, supra note 21, at 551–53.
See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DEP’T OF TRANSP., 2 MANUAL FOR
POLICE TRAFFIC SERVICES PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SYSTEM 1 (1977)
(“Productivity is not another name for ‘quotas.’ Productivity refers to measures of job
performance to be used in comparison to expected levels of performance.”).
246 Melissa Hipolit, Former Police Officer Exposes Chesterfield’s Ticket Quota Goals,
WTVR (July 15, 2014, 6:04 AM), https://wtvr.com/2014/07/14/chesterfield-quotainvestigation.
247 See ATLANTA CITIZEN REV. BD., STUDY AND INQUIRY INTO THE ATLANTA POLICE
DEPARTMENT’S INVOLVEMENT IN THE DEATH OF MS. KATHRYN JOHNSTON 24 (2010) (“A
manager must ensure that officers are working and the work is fairly distributed.”).
248 Bill Torpy, Did DeKalb’s Cops Have Arrest and Ticket Quotas?, ATLANTA J.-CONST.
(Oct. 2, 2016), https://www.ajc.com/news/local/bill-torpy-large-did-dekalb-cops-havearrest-and-ticket-quotas/GxkflThnOJIuaFTSQ5Fd7N.
249 See generally BARRON H. LERNER, ONE FOR THE ROAD: DRUNK DRIVING SINCE
1900 (2011) (tracing the history of drunk driving and efforts to stop it); JAMES B. JACOBS,
DRUNK DRIVING: AN AMERICAN DILEMMA (1989) (analyzing Americans’ drunk driving
problem and anti-drunk driving policies); Fredrick Kunkle, Americans Are Still Way Too
Tolerant of Drunken Driving, WASH. POST (Aug. 31, 2016, 8:02 AM) https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/tripping/wp/2016/08/31/americans-are-still-way-too-tolerant-ofdrunk-driving-safety-advocates-say (discussing the problem of drunk driving in the United
States today).
250 Implementation questions are related but not necessarily fatal to this rationale;
instead such administrative issues—which unavoidably implicate questions of race,
poverty, gender, and sexual orientation—can be attended to by training, oversight, and
compliance.
245
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reasonable to expect results, particularly in places where drunk
driving is likely to occur (e.g., large sporting events) or during times of
the year when people may be more willing to drink and drive (e.g.,
holidays). The absence of a numerical goal or a threat of adverse
employment action would render this enforcement priority an empty
mandate. For supporters of this defense, ticket quotas raise the stakes.
3.

Evaluation

251

05/11/2021 08:20:10

ATLANTA CITIZEN REV. BD., supra note 247, at 22.
See, e.g., Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1827, 1843 (2015) (“Policing agencies—for that is what they are, agencies of executive
government—fail to play by the rules of administrative governance.”).
253 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:14-181.2 (West, Westlaw through L.2020, c.126 and
J.R. No. 2) (“The department or force shall not use the number of arrests or citations
issued by a law enforcement officer as the sole criterion for promotion, demotion,
dismissal, or the earning of any benefit provided by the department or force.”); N.C. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 20-187.3 (West, Westlaw through S.L. 2020-97 of 2020 Reg. Sess.) (“Pay and
promotions of members of the Highway Patrol shall be based on their overall job
performance and not on the basis of the volume of citations issued or arrests made.”).
252
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One might also argue that quotas can be useful for evaluative
purposes. Various arguments are available on this front. First, as a
general matter, employment-based, numerical expectations are
unremarkable. In its discussion of quotas, the Atlanta Citizen Review
Board explained, “Production quotas are a common part of modern
life. Almost all of us work at jobs were [sic] we have explicit or
implicit numerical goals.”251 The power to arrest and a legally sanctioned monopoly over violence differentiate police from typical
employees, but it is not obvious that these extraordinary powers
should exempt law enforcement from standard models of employer
evaluation. In fact, such an exemption might add another layer to
“police exceptionalism,” much to the chagrin of criminal justice
reformers.252 Defenders of quotas might argue that numbers-based
imperatives should not be the only standards for evaluating police
officers, but they would certainly include quotas among them. They
would likely point to the fact that many statutes expressly prohibit law
enforcement from relying exclusively on numbers when assessing
officers.253 This argument for the evaluative utility of quotas focuses
on the standard nature of numbers-based evaluations in the employment world and highlights the need to consider numbers alongside
other factors.
Besides the normalcy of quantitative requirements in work settings, evaluation-based defenses of quotas also focus on their perceived tangibility and neutrality. On the former, Joe Giacalone, a
former New York City law enforcement officer who defends the use
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of quantitative benchmarks, claims that “[t]here are very few ways we
can evaluate police officers’ activity.”254 Since it is impossible to
“count how many times [police officers] shake someone’s hand on the
street,” Giacalone is unbothered by critiques of quotas and insists that
“it’s written in the job description to make arrests and write summons.”255 Alongside this results-oriented approach to policing is the
idea that quotas are straightforward and empirically superior to subjective assessments. Indeed, criminologists have acknowledged that
quotas are sometimes justified because “such numbers are easy to calculate and compare.”256 Some describe these quantitative metrics as
less vulnerable to the idiosyncrasies of police management.257
The idea of objectivity is significant because promotion in
policing is notoriously nepotistic and subject to interpersonal
politics.258 Quotas, it could be argued, provide a more impersonal way
to assess employee productivity and address longstanding concerns
about diversity in law enforcement.259
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254 George Joseph, NYPD Commander’s Text Messages Show How the Quota System
Persists, APPEAL (Dec. 12, 2018), https://theappeal.org/nypd-commanders-text-messagesshow-how-the-quota-system-persists.
255 Id.
256 STEVEN M. COX, SUSAN MARCHIONNA & BRIAN D. FITCH, INTRODUCTION TO
POLICING 243–44 (3d ed. 2017).
257 See FRANK J. LANDY, PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL IN POLICE DEPARTMENTS 6 (1977)
(“One of the major issues in performance measurement is the nature of the information
gathered . . . . Most critics of subjective or judgmental performance evaluation imply that
the judgment made by the supervisor is more related to personal idiosyncrasies than to the
behavior of the person being rated.”).
258 See THOMAS J. GRADEL & DICK SIMPSON, CORRUPT ILLINOIS: PATRONAGE,
CRONYISM, AND CRIMINALITY 136 (2015) (discussing how a Chicago police officer failed to
receive a promotion for failing to follow the directions of a corrupt local politician);
STEVEN LEINEN, BLACK POLICE, WHITE SOCIETY 136 (1984) (discussing how promotion
for detectives in the NYPD relied on both quantitative factors (number of arrests), and the
leveraging of personal connections (“having ‘sponsors’ or ‘personal contacts’ on the job”));
Andrea Shalal & Jonathan Landay, Black Cops Say Discrimination, Nepotism Behind U.S.
Police Race Gap, REUTERS (July 2, 2020, 10:28 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usminneapolis-police-blackofficers/black-cops-say-discrimination-nepotism-behind-u-spolice-race-gap-idUSKBN2432T8 (stating that discrimination in hiring and promotion has
hampered Black representation in police forces in the United States).
259 On diversity, see MANGAI NATARAJAN, WOMEN POLICE IN A CHANGING SOCIETY:
BACK DOOR TO EQUALITY (2008) (describing the development of women police over the
past twenty years); DAVID E. BARLOW & MELISSA HICKMAN BARLOW, POLICE IN A
MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY: AN AMERICAN STORY (2018) (describing the role that social,
political, and economic relationships have played in the historical development of the
police); see generally David Alan Sklansky, Not Your Father’s Police Department: Making
Sense of the New Demographics of Law Enforcement, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1209
(2006) (describing the recent dramatic shift in the demographics of police departments).
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4. Revenue Generation
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260 James DeHaven, Do Traffic Tickets Unfairly Hurt the Poor? Nevada Lawmakers
Eyeing Traffic Law Reforms, RENO GAZETTE-J. (Dec. 21, 2017, 4:42 PM), https://
www.rgj.com/story/ news/politics/2017/12/21/do-traffic-tickets-unfairly-hurt-poor-nevadalawmakers-again-eyeing-traffic-law-reforms-despite-city/975423001.
261 Id.
262 Haven Orecchio-Egresitz, Police Have Traditionally Protested Anti-Police Rhetoric
by Making Fewer Arrests. Right Now That’s Exactly What the Public Wants, INSIDER (June
16, 2020, 1:41 PM), https://www.insider.com/police-have-historically-protested-by-makingfewer-arrests-its-become-2020-6.
263 See Ferguson Report, supra note 17.
264 See infra Appendices A & B.
265 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3733.1(c)(3) (West, Westlaw through 2020
Reg. Sess. Act 95).
266 Governor Signs Bipartisan Bill to Extend Funding for Emergency Air Medical
Services, PR NEWSWIRE (Oct. 8, 2019, 2:42 PM), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-
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The image of mercenary police officers seizing civilians to meet
quantitative goals is unsavory and makes explicitly revenue-based
defenses of quotas rare. However, administrative practices across the
country reveal an undeniable fact: law enforcement helps generate
money for municipal coffers. This stark reality became clear in
Nevada a few years ago, when state legislators vigorously protested
the decriminalization of traffic tickets.260 They argued that such an
action would lead to an annual loss of $33 million in the counties of
Washoe and Reno.261
The profitability of law enforcement also helps explain why cities
get nervous when police officers engage in purposeful work slow
downs. Public safety is an issue, but so is money. “Cops not writing
summonses is usually very effective” and garners immediate attention
“because it affects the city finances greatly.”262 Perhaps the most
obscene version of policing for profit was the well-documented
debacle in Ferguson, Missouri, where the federal government found
that revenue, rather than public safety needs, shaped the city’s racially
discriminatory policing.263 Defenders of revenue-based policing might
concede that profit-motivated arrest quotas are indefensible and
instead limit their defense to quotas for traffic tickets and violations,
which represent the core feature of all anti-quota statutes and pending
bills.264
A revenue-based defense of police quotas would highlight the
fact that, in many jurisdictions, revenue from traffic violations helps
finance socially valuable goods. Pennsylvania imposes a two-dollar
surcharge on traffic violations that goes to its Access to Justice
Account, which funds civil legal services in the state.265 A recent
California law imposes a four-dollar fee on moving violations to support emergency air medical services.266 In a driver-friendly state with
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releases/governor-signs-bipartisan-bill-to-extend-funding-for-emergency-air-medicalservices-300934138.html; CAL. GOV’T CODE § 76000.10(c)(1) (West, Westlaw through ch.
372 of 2020 Reg. Sess.).
267 § 76000.10(e)(1).
268 Governor Signs Bipartisan Bill to Extend Funding for Emergency Air Medical
Services, supra note 266.
269 Laura Herzog, We Paid $405M in Tickets Last Year; See Where the Money Went,
NJ.COM (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.nj.com/news/2016/05/where_your_ticket_payment_
money_goes_funds_new_jer.html.
270 MICHIGAN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FISCAL AGENCY, FISCAL BRIEF: TRAFFIC
CITATION REVENUE 5 (2019), https://www.house.mi.gov/hfa/pdf/alpha/fiscal_brief_traffic_
citation_revenue.pdf.
271 See infra Appendix A.
272 Liz Gonzalez, Special Report: Why Traffic Tickets in California Are So High, FOX26
NEWS (Apr. 29, 2019), https://kmph.com/news/local/special-report-why-traffic-tickets-incalifornia-are-so-high.
273 See Maciag, supra note 5.
274 Id.
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the country’s largest population, this surcharge directly helps the critical victims of automobile accidents267 and improves services to rural
residents who need critical care in urban centers.268 Surcharges for
traffic violations in New Jersey fund research on spinal cord repair,
brain injury, and autism treatment.269 In Michigan during the 20172018 fiscal year, penal fine revenues, including fines from traffic
tickets, generated approximately $24.6 million, with $24.2 million distributed to public libraries and $392,800 distributed to law libraries.270
Notably, all of these states have quota prohibitions on the books.271
Government benefits derived from traffic violations, defenders would
argue, are not extraordinary.
With this reality of government-generated profit in mind, a
defender of quotas would argue that the remaining issue is whether
quotas are an ideal way to actualize the subsidies that flow out of
traffic laws. This is a question of tradeoffs.
Many jurisdictions rely on these kinds of cross-subsidies because
of the legislative and electoral unpopularity of raising taxes. Jeff
Cumins, a political scientist and expert in state budgets, captures this
problem: “Legislators can get creative in ways to find revenue. Particularly in the last decades we’ve been in an anti-tax orientation, and so
this is one way to raise money for legislators’ pet projects and programs.”272 Funding by traffic violations is particularly salient in rural
parts of the country as well as states in the southeast, where research
has shown that jurisdictions have an unusually high reliance on fees
and fines.273 These localities have small property tax bases and collect
fewer sales taxes than their urban counterparts because of relatively
lower commerce.274 Thus, “[e]ven when the ethical and fiscal
problems with financing government through fines are apparent,
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viable alternatives remain hard to find.”275 Defenders of quota-based
policing would contend that such regimes are just one part of a larger
set of tradeoffs when policymakers are considering how to diversify
money streams. They would argue that this version of policing should
be openly debated and carefully considered instead of categorically
rejected based on grotesque examples. Implementation and the
specter of discrimination still loom, but defenders of quotas would
maintain that these issues are analytically distinct and correctable.276
B. Counterarguments
Law enforcement, scholars of policing, critics of the police, and
the media have all offered insights that quickly dispense with some of
these rationales for quotas. This subsection supplements these insights
with new objections. It offers a point-by-point refutation of the abovedescribed defenses of quotas—some of which are compelling at first
glance but suffer from practical and empirical problems.
1. The Allure of Activity

05/11/2021 08:20:10

275 Matt Ford, The Problem with Funding Government Through Fines, ATLANTIC (Apr.
2, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/the-problem-with-fundinggovernment-through-fines/389387.
276 See supra note 249.
277 See TOM BARKER, POLICE ETHICS: CRISIS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 131 (3d ed. 2011)
(“Supervisors who impose quotas . . . increase the risks that officers will cut corners or
bend the laws . . . to meet the quotas . . . .”); ROGER G. DUNHAM & GEOFFREY P. ALPERT,
CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICING: CONTEMPORARY READINGS 207 (7th ed. 2015)
(“Management practices may encourage corruption by imposing pressures for arrest
quotas or make it acceptable to cut corners to effect arrests.”).
278 Michael Majchrowicz, 2nd Charleston Police Officer Who Falsified Traffic Tickets
Resigns from Department, POST & COURIER (Sept. 14, 2019), https://
www.postandcourier.com/news/2nd-charleston-police-officer-who-falsified-traffic-ticketsresigns-from-department/article_16b6279e-a334-11e9-a925-87076f916396.html.
279 Id.
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First, quota-based policing does not guard against shirking.
Quotas may produce law enforcement activity, but officers who want
to shirk will still find ways to cut corners even when there are quotas
in place designed to keep them productive.277 Consider the cases of
Blaine Morgan and Michael Baker, two police officers in Charleston,
South Carolina. Both officers disclosed that they falsified traffic
tickets in an effort “to boost their respective citations totals” and subsequently resigned.278 Their scam involved writing bogus traffic tickets
without motorists’ knowledge.279 The officers had the tickets dismissed because they had no intention of following through on them in
court. But, as one news article said at the time, “one of the officers
apparently slipped up. He did not dismiss a ticket in time for court
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280 Anne Emerson, CPD Chief: Full-Scale Investigation into Unwarranted Ticket
Writing, ABC4 NEWS (July 11, 2019), https://abcnews4.com/news/local/cpd-chief-full-scaleinvestigation-into-unwarranted-ticket-writing.
281 Id.
282 Ray v. Miss. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 172 So. 3d 182, 184 (Miss. 2015).
283 Id. at 186.
284 Id. at 185.
285 Matt Rocheleau, State Police Overtime Scheme, Illegal Ticket Quota Was Devised by
Higher-Ups 20 Years Ago, Former Trooper Says, BOS. GLOBE (Feb. 6, 2020, 8:56 PM),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/02/07/metro/state-police-overtime-scheme-ticket-quotasystem-stretches-back-20-years-former-trooper-says.
286 Scott J. Croteau, Were Mass. State Police Troopers in OT Scandal Told to Fill Ticket
Quotas? Agency Denies New Allegation in Federal Court Filing, MASS. LIVE (Mar. 20,
2019), https://www.masslive.com/news/2019/03/were-mass-state-police-troopers-in-otscandal-told-to-fill-ticket-quotas-agency-denies-new-allegation-in-federal-court-filing.html.
287 Id.

43166-nyu_96-2 Sheet No. 103 Side B

and the driver was notified.”280 After Officer Morgan resigned; the
Charleston Police Department admitted that Morgan artificially
inflated the number of tickets written in an attempt to conceal the fact
that he was not actively and appropriately patrolling his area.281 This
statement casts doubts on whether quotas can mitigate shirking and
highlights the perverse incentives they invite.
A similar case involving the termination of a ticket-falsifying,
quota-fulfilling officer made it to the Supreme Court of Mississippi.
The state fired officer Sammy William Ray for writing “ghost
tickets.”282 In a sworn statement, he confessed, “During the time I
have been employed with the [Mississippi Department of Public
Safety], I have written 20–25 tickets that may or may not be factual
tickets . . . . This was done to increase my ticket activity.”283 In an
interview where he was questioned about his motives, he unambiguously added, “I was just trying to play a numbers game. You know,
just trying to stay out of hot water.”284
A massive overtime abuse scandal in Massachusetts also injects
doubt into whether police quotas actually make officers more productive. The overtime scandal dated back to 1996 and involved more than
twenty officers in the now-defunct Troop E of the Massachusetts State
Police (MSP), which patrolled the Massachusetts Turnpike.285 Prosecutors claimed that officers were “expected to issue a minimum of 810 citations” for each shift.286 Inability to meet this requirement “had
to be explained to supervisors and command staff,” and “[r]epeated
failures to meet this quota often resulted in a trooper being blocked
from receiving [such] overtime opportunities.”287
Because MSP received federal funding, the Department of Justice
became involved and ultimately charged and convicted eight people of
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various embezzlement-related charges.288 Quotas were a motivating
factor in the overtime scheme. According to one of the Department of
Justice’s sentencing announcements, the officers “admitted that they
had been paid for hours they did not work, and for overtime shifts
from which they left early.”289 The scheme was so elaborate that the
federal judge directed prosecutors to revisit whether the parties
should be charged with conspiracy.290
Elsewhere, quota-based policing has led officers to plant crack on
innocent people,291 lazily dump summonses on clearly abandoned
cars,292 cite fictitious drivers,293 and ticket dead people.294 Such malfeasance is not only in the domain of individual decisionmaking but
can shape organizational culture. Police supervisors who require
officers to meet quotas are also beholden to numbers in ways that
encourage the aforementioned forms of misconduct.295 The absence of
empirical scholarship on quota-based shirking, coupled with the exis-
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288 See, e.g., U.S. Attorney’s Office, District of Mass., Former Massachusetts State
Trooper Sentenced to Three Months in Prison for Overtime Fraud (Mar. 26, 2019), https://
www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/former-massachusetts-state-trooper-sentenced-three-monthsprison-overtime-fraud.
289 Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office: District of Mass., Two Massachusetts State
Troopers Sentenced in Overtime Abuse Investigation (June 4, 2019), https://
www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/two-massachusetts-state-troopers-sentenced-overtime-abuseinvestigation.
290 Matt Rocheleau, Judge Orders Federal Prosecutors to Explore Whether State Police
OT Scandal Was a ‘Conspiracy,’ BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 30, 2020, 3:45 PM), https://
www.bostonglobe.com/2020/01/30/metro/judge-wolf-orders-federal-prosecutors-explorewhether-state-police-overtime-scandal-was-conspiracy.
291 See Oren Yaniv, Ex-Cop Jason Arbeeny Cries for Judge, Gets Probation; Judge
Gustin Reichbach Could Have Given Him 4 Years, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 3, 2012), https://
www.nydailynews.com/new-york/ex-cop-jason-arbeeny-cries-judge-probation-judge-gustinreichbach-4-years-article-1.1016083; Press Release, Drug Policy Alliance, Former NYPD
Detective Testifies that Police Regularly Plant Drugs on Innocent People to Meet Arrest
Quota (Oct. 12, 2011), https://www.drugpolicy.org/news/2011/10/former-nypd-detectivetestifies-police-regularly-plant-drugs-innocent-people-meet-arres; Jim Dwyer, The Drugs?
They Came from the Police, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/
14/nyregion/those-drugs-they-came-from-the-police.html.
292 ELIZABETH REUSS-IANNI, TWO CULTURES OF POLICING: STREET COPS AND
MANAGEMENT COPS 112 (1983).
293 Tom Jackman, Md. Trooper Wrote DWI Tickets to Fictitious Drivers, Pleads Guilty to
Perjury, WASH. POST (Aug. 6, 2020, 6:33 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/crime-law/
2020/08/06/md-trooper-wrote-dwi-tickets-fictitious-drivers-pleads-guilty-perjury.
294 Paul Pizzuto, Ex-NYPD Officer, Says He Ticketed Dead People to Meet Quotas,
HUFFPOST (Sept. 7, 2012, 11:17 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/paul-pizzuto-exnypd-officer-ticketed-dead-people-quotas_n_1864310.
295 See Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1037, 1044 n.32 (1996) (“[P]olice supervisors, driven by the same crime
control and quota pressures that drive field officers, actively encourage testilying.”).
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tence of widespread evidence of police corruption,296 leads to the reasonable conclusion that these requirements do not incentivize diligent
policing and instead contribute to the scourge of wrongful
convictions.297
2. Arbitrariness
Arbitrariness and inattention to quality foil the expectation that
quotas will enhance police productivity. It bears noting that how one
measures productivity depends on how one envisions the function of
police. The purpose of law enforcement is usually tied to standard
conceptions of crime control, public safety, and private property protection. But many critics of the criminal justice system attribute other,
less uplifting goals, to the police, including enforcement of the racial
order and oversight of the poor. There is much evidence to support
the latter understanding.298 However, this Section’s analysis will proceed, for argument’s sake, with the former, good-faith conception of
the police.
Even assuming that police serve the socially beneficial purpose of
protecting life and property, numbers will not be completely impeachable and have a role in how this division of government is evaluated.
But per se quotas are blunt objects that do not neatly get at public
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296 See IVKOVIC, supra note 116; Rudovsky, supra note 116; Russell Covey, Police
Misconduct as a Cause of Wrongful Convictions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1133, 1133 (2013);
Carroll Seron, Joseph Pereira & Jean Kovath, Judging Police Misconduct: “Street-Level”
Versus Professional Policing, 38 L. & SOC’Y REV. 665 (2004) (surveying New York City
residents’ accounts of instances where police officers engaged in prohibited behavior such
as use of unnecessary force and abuse of authority).
297 See JESSICA S. HENRY, SMOKE BUT NO FIRE: CONVICTING THE INNOCENT OF CRIMES
THAT NEVER HAPPENED 66 (2020) (“Quotas result in no-crime wrongful convictions
because they motivate the police to arrest people for crimes that never happened and
cause innocent people to plead guilty [to them] so they can go home.”).
298 See, e.g., PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN (2017); SALLY E.
HADDEN, SLAVE PATROLS: LAW AND VIOLENCE IN VIRGINIA AND THE CAROLINAS (2001);
ALEXES HARRIS, A POUND OF FLESH: MONETARY SANCTIONS AS PUNISHMENT FOR THE
POOR (2016); TALITHA L. LEFLOURIA, CHAINED IN SILENCE: BLACK WOMEN AND
CONVICT LABOR IN THE NEW SOUTH (2015); ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT
WITHOUT CRIME: HOW OUR MASSIVE MISDEMEANOR SYSTEM TRAPS THE INNOCENT AND
MAKES AMERICA MORE UNEQUAL (2018); ANDREA J. RITCHIE, INVISIBLE NO MORE:
POLICE VIOLENCE AGAINST BLACK WOMEN AND WOMEN OF COLOR (2017); LOÏC
WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL
INSECURITY (2009); NEIL WEBSDALE, POLICING THE POOR: FROM SLAVE PLANTATION TO
PUBLIC HOUSING (2001); Bruce Western & Katherine Beckett, How Unregulated Is the
U.S. Labor Market? The Penal System as a Labor Market Institution, 104 AM. J. SOC.
(1999).
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safety. Scholars and legislative supporters have noted their arbitrariness,299 but there is more to unearth.
The arbitrariness of police quotas is highlighted by their overinclusive and underinclusive nature. Unreasonably high quotas can
extract officers’ time and prevent them from addressing more serious
threats that, if attended to, could lead to greater public safety benefits.300 When quotas are low, as supporters claim, public safety benefits are questionable.301 A quota of two arrests every six weeks led one
cop to offer the following query: “Suppose the officer makes two
arrests the first two weeks? What does he do the next four?”302 If the
productivity rationale governs, the officer could technically coast.
Ultimately, the productivity defense for quotas is rife with incoherence. It can be irresponsive to public safety by serving as a distraction
from more serious criminal wrongdoing. This rationale can also be
insensitive to public safety by only scratching the surface of illegality
and allowing officers to satisfy a minimal threshold quota that may not
correspond with actual criminal offending.
3.

Thin Evaluations

05/11/2021 08:20:10

299 See, e.g., Bronstein, supra note 21, at 545; Mitch Smith, New Law Bans Police Use of
Ticket Quotas, CHI. TRIB. (June 16, 2014), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm2014-06-16-chi-quinn-signs-into-law-bill-banning-police-ticket-quota-20140615-story.html
(noting support for Illinois’s quota statute and quoting one legislator who stated,
“Arbitrary quotas on the number of tickets that have to be issued by police officers
undermines the public trust in the police departments’ priorities . . . [b]y eliminating these
quotas, we can restore that trust and ensure that police officers are free to do their job
protecting the public”).
300 David I. Dewar, Goal Displacement, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
AND PUBLIC POLICY 193, 196 (David Andrew Schultz & James A. Beverly eds., 2004).
301 See id.
302 Athelia Knight & Benjamin L. Weiser, Street Cops, WASH. POST (July 12, 1982),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1982/07/12/street-cops/68359866-8b674514-a6a2-3aa39b4a1b38.
303 Stephen Cain, Comment to Ticket Quota for Ypsilanti Police Officers Is Illegal,
Arbitrator Finds, ANN ARBOR NEWS (Feb. 5, 2010, 6:04 AM), http://www.annarbor.com/
news/ticket-quota-for-ypsilanti-police-officers-is-illegal-arbitrator-finds.
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It is undeniable that law enforcement leadership needs some
method to evaluate officers, but quotas are subpar instruments for
such assessments. Critics of quotas inside and outside of law enforcement have taken the laziness rationale and deployed it against supervisors, with one online commenter arguing that “[q]uotas are
management’s lazy attempt to make a very few lazy employees pick
up the pace.”303 But a simpler, less loaded critique is available: Quotas
poorly capture the qualitative dimensions of policing and misguidedly
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privilege quantity. The insights of criminologist Malcolm Sparrow are
helpful here. Professor Sparrow writes:
Some departments set targets for functional outputs, including
enforcement activities such as arrests, stops, searches and traffic
citations. This . . . should never be the default position or become
normal practice. If you want quality work from a carpenter, it
makes no sense to demand that he or she drill a certain number of
holes or hammer a quota of nails. The essence of craftsmanship
involves mastery of all the tools and the ability to select among
them based on a clear understanding of the specific task in hand.
Functional quotas make little sense in this context.304

The obsession with quantity sacrifices a long list of qualitative concerns that are relevant to policing, namely good judgment, fairness,
reasonableness, and legality.305 Defenders of quotas may point to statutes that prohibit exclusive consideration of citations and arrests and
require evaluations to be holistic. Nevertheless, the constellation of
case law, settlements, officer testimony, and media accounts described
in this Article suggests that, at a bare minimum, holistic evaluation of
police is not a typical practice.306

304

Sparrow, supra note 34, at 18.
Id. at 18–20; see also Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 601 (S.D.N.Y.
2013) (“For the purposes of performance review, an unconstitutional stop is no less
valuable to an officer’s career than a constitutional one—because the two are
indistinguishable.”); Tracey L. Meares, The Good Cop: Knowing the Difference Between
Lawful or Effective Policing and Rightful Policing—And Why it Matters, 54 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1865, 1875–80 (2013) (describing rightful policing, which focuses on the fairness of
police conduct, as opposed to the traditional emphases on lawful or efficient policing). The
obsession with numbers is not unique to policing: Scholars have criticized how prosecutors,
too, overemphasize convictions and their win-loss records at the expense of fair criminal
justice outcomes. See Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial
Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 992, 987 (2009) (suggesting that “prosecutors view
their jobs as maximizing convictions” and, along the lines of Professor Sparrow, noting
how “conviction statistics ignore other important outcomes, such as declinations,
sentences, and victim satisfaction”); Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the
Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 883
(2009) (“Prosecutors may feel the need to be able to point to a record of convictions and
long sentences if they want to be promoted or to land high-powered jobs outside the
government.”); Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Power, Discretion, and
Misconduct, 23 CRIM. JUST. 24, 28 (2008) (remarking that most of the prosecutors the
author, a criminal procedure scholar and former director of the D.C. Public Defender
Service, engaged with “seemed to focus almost exclusively on securing convictions, without
consideration of whether a conviction would result in the fairest or most satisfactory result
for the accused or even the victim”).
306 STAMPER, supra note 22, at 3 (“In fact, many supervisors believe that counting and
recapping activity is the only way to evaluate police performance.”).
305
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4. Tradeoffs and Revenue-Based Defenses
Finally, it should go without saying that the police should not be
tasked with generating revenue. Though such a normative claim may
seem obvious, it chafes against the entrepreneurial realities of
American policing. “Economic sanctions,” Beth Colgan explains,
“constitute the most common form of punishment in the United
States.”307 If the profit-based defense of police quotas rests on a question of tradeoffs—that is, tickets allow localities to generate revenue
when they cannot raise taxes—then the tradeoffs at least need to be
named and assessed.
Fortunately, empiricists are beginning to name the costs of forprofit policing. Many of their studies focus on the disproportionate
racial effects of policing for profit.308 But even when measured only in
terms of the public-safety purpose of policing, quotas come with considerable costs. Rebecca Goldstein and her colleagues have studied
how municipal reliance on fees, fines, and forfeitures, as opposed to
taxes, produce “undesirable outcomes that may not have been anticipated by policymakers aiming simply to cover a revenue shortfall.”309
Relying on census data that collected the revenue and expenditure
data of approximately 90,000 local governments, they found that reallocating police resources to money-generating activity was “associated
with neglect of other important police functions, namely, the investigation of violent crimes.”310 This revenue-based orientation ultimately
“compromises their ability to perform their traditional functions.”311
According to the study, a one percent increase in the share of revenues from fees, fines, and forfeitures is associated with a 3.7 per43166-nyu_96-2 Sheet No. 106 Side A
05/11/2021 08:20:10

307 Beth A. Colgan, Beyond Graduation: Economic Sanctions and Structural Reform, 69
DUKE L.J. 1529, 1537 (2020).
308 See generally, Akheil Singla, Charlotte Kirschner & Samuel B. Stone, Race,
Representation, and Revenue: Reliance on Fines and Forfeitures in City Governments, 56
URB. AFFS. REV. 1132 (2020); Allison P. Harris, Elliott Ash & Jeffrey A. Fagan, Fiscal
Pressures and Discriminatory Policing: Evidence from Traffic Stops in Missouri, 5 J. RACE,
ETHNICITY, & POL. 450 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1017/rep.2020.10; Kelsey Shoub, Leah
Christiani, Frank R. Baumgartner, Derek A. Epp & Kevin Roach, Fines, Fees, Forfeitures,
and Disparities: A Link Between Municipal Reliance on Fines and Racial Disparities in
Policing, 0 POL’Y STUD. J. 1 (Aug. 7, 2020), https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.12412.
309 Rebecca Goldstein, Michael W. Sances & Hye Young You, Exploitative Revenues,
Law Enforcement, and the Quality of Government Service, 56 URB. AFFS. REV. 5, 24
(2018); see also Michael D. Makowsky & Thomas Stratmann, Political Economy at Any
Speed: What Determines Traffic Citations?, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 509, 510 (2009) (finding in
empirical study that “the likelihood and dollar amounts of fines [for speeding tickets] are
decreasing functions of local property tax revenue” and also that “the likelihood of
receiving a speeding fine is higher in towns that are in a fiscal crunch caused by a rejected
increase in the property tax limit”).
310 Id.
311 Id.
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centage point decrease in the clearance rate for violent crimes.312
Economist Anna Harvey has similarly concluded that “fiscal incentives can distort the allocation of law enforcement effort[s]” in ways
that have distributional consequences for public safety.313 Notwithstanding empirical work that highlights the compromising cost of
profit-based policing, there are a host of other constituent-specific
problems with police quotas.
C.

Additional Objections

It is essential to not let defenses of quotas and counterarguments
to them totally consume how quotas are understood. This subsection
offers a series of additional reasons why quotas constitute lousy
policy. To highlight the unique possibility for building consensus on
prohibiting quotas, this subsection focuses specifically on three constituents: law enforcement, the general public, and racial minorities.
1.

Law Enforcement Objections

312

05/11/2021 08:20:10

Id.
Anna Harvey, Fiscal Incentives in Law Enforcement, 22 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 173,
173 (2020). In his support for Illinois’s statute, Chicago State Senator Bill Cunningham
relevantly noted, “Policing should not be used as a revenue enhancement strategy by
municipalities. . . . Officers will no longer be distracted from their regular law enforcement
duties in order to meet ticket quotas.” See Cunningham Bill Signed into Law, BEVERLY
REV. (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.beverlyreview.net/news/community_news/
article_618a47fe-aae8-11e8-9a28-872a66178e5c.html; see also Michael D. Makowsky,
Thomas Stratmann & Alex Tabarrok, To Serve and Collect: The Fiscal and Racial
Determinants of Law Enforcement, 48 J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 189 (2019) (finding in empirical
study “that revenue-driven law enforcement can distort police behavior and decisionmaking, . . . altering the quantity, type, and racial composition of arrests”).
314 See Bronstein, supra note 21, at 550.
315 Patrick J. Lynch, The Real Fix for Stop-and-Frisk, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 7, 2013,
4:20 AM), https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/real-fix-stop-and-frisk-article-1.1476893.
316 Id.
313
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Police officers and police unions have been some of the most
prominent opponents of quotas. Two criticisms often offered by
unions stand out. The first concerns how quotas curtail the discretion
of officers.314 Patrick Lynch, head of the Police Benevolent
Association, the police union for the NYPD, has been vocal on this
issue. In an op-ed that was relatively dismissive of the racial dimensions of police-citizen encounters, Lynch argued that quotas were the
source of New York City’s policing woes.315 Such requirements, he
complained, “risk turning officers into automatons.”316 The Illinois
Fraternal Order of Police Labor Council, which supported Illinois’s
quota statute, echoes a similar sentiment on its website, stating that
“[q]uotas turn police officers into tax collection machines instead of
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317 Brenda Schory, New Law to End Ticket Quotas; Locally, Most Local Police Agencies
Say They Never Had Them Anyway, KANE CNTY. CHRON. (July 31, 2014, 10:48 PM),
https://www.kcchronicle.com/2014/07/29/new-law-to-end-ticket-quotas-most-local-policeagencies-say-they-never-had-them-anyway/afzdt5z.
318 Yoohyun Jung, Police Union Calls for Elimination of Traffic-Ticket Quota, ARIZ.
DAILY STAR (Oct. 9, 2014), https://tucson.com/news/blogs/police-beat/police-union-callsfor-elimination-of-traffic-ticket-quota/article_2cde50a7-10a0-5e18-89087335510ce811.html.
319 New WA Bill Would Discourage Traffic-Ticket Quotas for Officers, MYNORTHWEST
(Feb. 17, 2020, 2:44 PM), https://mynorthwest.com/1723060/ticket-quotas-officerswashington.
320 Senate Passes Holy Bill that Seeks to Discourage Traffic-Ticket Quotas for Officers,
WASH. STATE SENATE REPUB. CAUCUS (Feb. 17, 2020) (emphasis added), https://
jeffholy.src.wastateleg.org/tag/sen-jeff-holy.
321 See supra text accompanying notes 309–13.
322 POLICE REFORM ORG. PROJECT, supra note 14, at 3.
323 Id.
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professional law enforcement officers. It distracts police officers in the
exercise of their day-to-day law enforcement activities.”317
Quotas are legal in Arizona, but the Tucson Police Officers
Association has advocated for a statutory prohibition. Jason Winsky,
government affairs director for the union, declared, “We’re just philosophically opposed to any kind of quota . . . . It’s a morale issue for us
because the officer no longer has discretion.”318 In Washington, where
quotas are also legal, retired Spokane police officer and Washington
State Senator Jeff Holy sponsored a bill prohibiting the practice.319
For Holy, “[a]n officer’s ability to make an independen[t] decision
allows them to apply the level of enforcement action they believe to
be appropriate for the situation. An officer being directed to apply
enforcement action to comply with an employer policy or ticket quota
reflects badly on law enforcement.”320 These discretion-based objections are organized around the belief that quotas lead officers to be
ruled by numbers instead of common-sense judgment.
Curtailed discretion bleeds into the second major criticism
offered by police: that quotas limit the scope of their work. This critique works in two different directions. On one end is a concern that
quotas prevent officers from attending to more serious crimes. Quantitative studies of law enforcement priorities lend support to this
idea.321 On the other end is a concern that quotas disincentivize police
from engaging in socially beneficial activity that is less penal and
harder to quantify. “If I break up a fight between two boys and send
them home, I don’t get credit,” an officer explained.322 “If I help
deliver a baby in an emergency, I get no credit. But I score points if I
issue a seat belt summons . . . .”323
When quotas distract from serious crimes and preclude the ostensible services that law enforcement holds itself out as offering (officers
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pledge to protect and serve), the nature of police work narrows, and
public safety is compromised. Of course, quotas are not diametrically
opposed to public safety, but they create scenarios where the public
safety objective is deprioritized. Adherence to quotas leads police
officers to be more concerned about obtaining a reward or avoiding a
penalty.324 Many officers are unbothered by this state of affairs and
play the numbers game, but some disapprove. Their objections supply
a powerful internal critique.
It is critical to understand that police unions are not typically
torchbearers of criminal justice reform. In many ways, they have
impeded reform.325 As organizations tasked with ensuring optimal
work conditions for their members, union concerns about quotas are
far from selfless. Officers who protest quotas in their individual capacities typically do so as a response to employment grievances rather
than altruistic civil rights concerns. These sobering realities do not,
however, mean that the police’s insights on quotas are bankrupt. In
fact, their complaints are consonant with scholarly observations and
warrant meaningful consideration.
2.

Racial Vulnerability

05/11/2021 08:20:10

324 Molly Davis, Why the Utah Legislature Banned Police Quotas, LIBERTAS INST. (Mar.
19, 2018), https://libertasutah.org/op-eds/why-the-utah-legislature-banned-police-quotas.
325 See Benjamin Levin, What’s Wrong with Police Unions?, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1333,
1340–46 (2020) (describing the critiques of police unions); Catherine L. Fisk & L. Song
Richardson, Police Unions, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 712, 747–56 (2017) (discussing how
police unions have been obstacles to criminal justice reform); Stephen Rushin, Police
Union Contracts, 66 DUKE L.J. 1191, 1191 (2017) (arguing that internal disciplinary
procedures developed by police unions during the collective bargaining process can hinder
criminal justice reform).
326 Wallace, supra note 44.
327 Id.
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Vulnerability to violent police encounters, and the racial subjugation that has been a feature of policing, make racial minorities foreseeable critics of quotas. This opposition is well warranted. Officers
have confessed to using racial minorities to fulfill their quotas and pad
their statistics.
In New Jersey, one officer described quota compliance as a sport
that took place in minority communities. “Guys were going out. They
were competing for how many tickets each guy could get,” he
revealed.326 “They’re saying they’re going out hunting. You go to
traffic court and you see the impact. 90% of the people you see there
are blacks and latinos.”327 The practice of “hunting” occurred in New
York, too. In an affidavit in one of many cases involving police quotas,
former NYPD officer Christopher LaForce said that he had decided
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to retire because of the fatigue that quota-inspired racial profiling
induced. “I got tired of hunting Black and Hispanic people because of
arrest quotas,” he complained.328 In addition to civilians, quotas also
impact minority officers. These officials, who some hold out as a solution to racist policing, are sometimes forced to comply with a practice
that facilitates discrimination and jeopardizes police relations with
minority communities.329 Additional empirical evidence suggests that
minorities bear the brunt of the kinds of revenue-based policing that
sometimes informs quota regimes.
On the federal level, Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) has long had formal arrest quotas that impact the undocumented population and the predominantly Latinx community that is
subject to ICE raids.330 The Department of Justice’s investigation into
the City of Ferguson led it to conclude that “[F]erguson’s police and
municipal court practices both reflect and exacerbate existing racial
bias,” and specifically recommended that the Ferguson Police
Department “[p]rohibit the use of ticketing and arrest quotas,
whether formal or informal.”331
The vulnerability of racial minorities to being targeted by quotas
can lead to unnecessary, and sometimes violent, contact with the
police. Recall that South Carolina passed its quota statute in response
to a police officer’s killing of Walter Scott, an unarmed Black man.
The defense team argued that the encounter stemmed from the
officer’s attempt to fulfill his department-mandated quota of three
minor violations every shift.332 A desire to decrease unnecessary
police and citizen contact also motivated Tennessee’s recent quota
43166-nyu_96-2 Sheet No. 108 Side A
05/11/2021 08:20:10

328 Joseph Goldstein & Ashley Southall, ‘I Got Tired of Hunting Black and Hispanic
People,’ N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/06/nyregion/nycpolice-subway-racial-profiling.html.
329 See id.; CRIME + PUNISHMENT, supra note 68; Sklansky, supra note 259 (discussing
how the diversification of police departments affects their relationships with the
communities they serve).
330 See Diaz-Bernal v. Myers, 758 F. Supp. 2d 106, 114 (D. Conn. 2010); Nathan
Treadwell, Fugitive Operations and the Fourth Amendment: Representing Immigrants
Arrested in Warrantless Home Raids, 89 N.C. L. REV. 507, 560–61 (2011); Michael J.
O’Brien, “Widespread” Uncertainty: The Exclusionary Rule in Civil-Removal Proceedings,
81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1883, 1898–99 (2014).
331 Ferguson Report, supra note 17, at 2, 91.
332 Cynthia Roldan, Ticket Quota Limit Proposal for Law Enforcement Heads for Senate
Floor, POST & COURIER (Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.postandcourier.com/politics/ticketquota-limit-proposal-for-law-enforcement-heads-for-senate/article_14f44c11-d0f2-57c091b1-69b23bd536c8.html.
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[W]hen you go hunting, when you put any type of numbers on a
police officer to perform, we are going to go for the most vulnerable. Of course, we’re going to go for the LGBT community, we’re

333
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See Arnold, supra note 95.
Act of July 15, 2020, ch. 801, 2020 Tenn. Pub. Acts, https://publications.tnsosfiles.
com/acts/111/pub/pc0801.pdf.
335 Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
336 Id. at 598–99.
337 Devon W. Carbado, Predatory Policing, 85 UMKC L. REV. 545, 561 (2017).
338 Id.
334
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statute,333 which levies criminal fines on law enforcement officials who
impose quotas.334
A pause is necessary here, lest causal mechanisms get confused.
Quotas do not cause police brutality and killings. Rogue officers and
legal cultures of impunity are better explanations. But quotas can
create the conditions for violent or even lethal interactions. Quotas
figured prominently in an almost 200-page decision where a federal
judge painstakingly described how the NYPD maintained a racist
stop-and-frisk policy that flouted constitutional rules.335 That policy
encouraged officers to “crush the fucking city,” and indiscriminately
stop Black and Latinx people without any legal reason because they
“‘can always articulate’ some basis for a stop after the fact.”336 Testimonies given to the Center for Constitutional Rights, which litigated
the Floyd case, described how stops often resulted in excessive use of
force by police against minorities who were slapped, thrown against
walls, tasered, and brutalized.
Moreover, quotas subject racial minorities to police interactions
that are often devoid of legal remedies and exacerbate their marginalization. Devon Carbado’s insights into the relationship between racial
vulnerability and police misconduct are clarifying. “The more vulnerable a group is to predatory policing, the greater that group’s police
contact and thus the greater the exposure to the possibility of violence.”337 Such predation “trades on and compounds the marginalization of an already marginalized group” and “facilitates police violence
by increasing the frequency [of minority contact] with the police.”338
An intersectional analysis further reveals how quotas exacerbate
social inequality and make marginalized groups easy targets for police
misconduct. Women of color, low-income people, and members of the
LGBTQ community are particularly susceptible to being targeted by
quota-fulfilling police officers. Police whistleblower Adhyl Polanco
explains:
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going to the black community, we’re going to those that have no
vote, that have no power.339

Quotas exacerbate social vulnerability and make marginalized groups
easy targets for police misconduct. When set against the larger context
of police corruption, the predatory nature of quotas demonstrates why
the practice constitutes bad policy.
3.

The General Significance of Quotas

05/11/2021 08:20:10

339 Sarah Wallace, More NYPD Officers Say There’s Proof of Quota-Driven Arrests,
NBC N.Y. (Apr. 1, 2016, 8:48 PM), https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/nypd-officersarrest-quota-exclusive-interview-pressure-numbers.
340 See DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
24 (2008).
341 Id.
342 Id.
343 Albert T. Quick, Attitudinal Aspects of Police Compliance with Procedural Due
Process, 6 AM. J. CRIM. L. 25, 31 (1978).
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Police quotas should concern the general population. Some
people may be undisturbed or feel unaffected by the problems police
quotas invite either because they occupy a demographic group that is
not a posterchild for mass incarceration or because they imagine
themselves as law-abiding and invulnerable to quota-based policing.
Criminal law theorist Doug Husak invites skepticism of such
beliefs.340 He observes that “[o]ffenses are so far-reaching that almost
everyone has committed one or more at some time or another; the
criminal law no longer distinguishes ‘us’ from ‘them.’ ”341 Going a step
further, Professor Husak estimates that “over 70% of living adult
Americans have committed an imprisonable offense at some point in
their life.”342 Thus, the average person should be concerned about
quotas because they likely engage in activities that come under the
purview of this kind of policing.
Quotas can also lead to routine violations of constitutional rights
and civil liberties. An officer who is forced to comply with a quota
“will find it difficult to be sympathetic to procedural due process
guidelines which stand in the way of filling his quota.”343 In addition
to due process issues, quotas invite equal protection problems, implicate Fourth Amendment issues related to unconstitutional police
stops, and raise First Amendment concerns involving a police officer’s
ability to speak out about quotas without fear of retaliation. Constitutional problems with quotas have arisen in large, diverse metropolitan
areas like New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles as well as small cities
like Mount Enterprise, Texas (with a population of approximately 450
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344 Mount Enterprise, Texas Population 2020, WORLD POPULATION REV., https://
worldpopulationreview.com/us-cities/mount-enterprise-tx-population (last visited Jan. 9,
2020); Utah Population 2020, WORLD POPULATION REV., https://worldpopulationreview.
com/states/utah-population (last visited Dec. 20, 2020).
345 James Spadola, Delaware Should Ban Police Quotas, DEL. ONLINE (July 28, 2017,
11:45 AM), https://www.delawareonline.com/story/opinion/contributors/2017/07/28/
delaware-should-ban-police-quotas-james-spadola/519661001.
346 JOHN A. ETERNO & ELI B. SILVERMAN, THE CRIME NUMBERS GAME:
MANAGEMENT BY MANIPULATION (2017); see also Bronstein, supra note 21, at 555–56.
347 ETERNO & SILVERMAN, supra note 346, at 11.
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people) and racially homogenous states like Utah (approximately
ninety percent white).344
James Spadola, a former Delaware officer who has advocated for
anti-quota legislation in his state, argues that “quotas transform civilians into a performance measure and potential arrest statistic, as
opposed to an American with constitutional rights and protections
that should be served and protected by the police.”345 The availability
of more sanitized euphemisms (e.g., performance standards, targets,
activity) and the lack of rigorous investigations into quotas keep the
general public from realizing how common they are in law enforcement. In a country that is only beginning to understand the problems
of over-policing, quotas are a poorly understood practice that compromise an already fragile body of constitutional law.
For conservatives and liberals who believe that the police serve a
public safety function, quotas are distortive and jeopardize the legitimacy of law enforcement. These distortive features may be of particular concern to law-and-order conservatives. John Eterno, a
criminologist who spent two decades as an officer and retired as a
captain in the NYPD, explains how quotas pervert police goals in his
book The Crime Numbers Game: Management by Manipulation.346
Eterno and his co-author Eli Silverman (also a criminologist) argue
that quotas encourage police to focus on less difficult crimes “at the
expense of more significant and arduous arrests.”347 In a society
where consensual crimes like drug trafficking leave no discernible
complainant, murders often go unsolved, sexual assault is underreported, and white-collar crimes go unpunished. This should be a cause
of concern for fiscal conservatives, law-and-order advocates, and supporters of victims’ rights.
Deeper questions of legitimacy also abound, as quotas undermine
liberal concerns about procedural justice and the rule of law. Laurie
Robinson, who was responsible for developing recommendations after
the Department of Justice’s Ferguson investigation, explained how
quotas and numbers-policing can shape public opinion: “If citizens
believe that tickets are being issued or arrests are being made for rea-
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348 Joel Rose, Despite Laws and Lawsuits, Quota-Based Policing Lingers, NPR (Apr. 4,
2015, 4:47 AM), https://www.npr.org/2015/04/04/395061810/despite-laws-and-lawsuitsquota-based-policing-lingers.
349 See Smith, supra note 299; Jonathan Banks, Thing Blue Lies: How Pretextual Stops
Undermine Police Legitimacy, 66 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 931 (2016).
350 Marina Bell, Abolition: A New Paradigm for Reform, LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 14
(2000).
351 See, e.g., Abolition Can’t Wait, 8 TO ABOLITION, https://www.8toabolition.com/why
(last visited Jan. 9, 2020); Dan Berger, Mariame Kaba & David Stein, What Abolitionists
Do, JACOBIN (Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/08/prison-abolitionreform-mass-incarceration.
352 The Big Reason Tampa Police Write So Many Tickets: They’re Told To, TAMPA BAY
TIMES (Dec. 16, 2015), https://www.tampabay.com/news/publicsafety/crime/theres-a-bigreason-tampa-police-write-so-many-tickets/2252912.
353 See Peter Simek, What ‘Defunding’ the Dallas Police Department Could Look Like,
D MAG. (June 12, 2020, 11:14 AM), https://www.dmagazine.com/frontburner/2020/06/whatdefunding-the-dallas-police-department-could-look-like.
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sons other than the goal of law enforcement,” she contends, “then
their trust in the legitimacy of the system is really eroded.”348 Others
have echoed this view.349 As liberal reformers and some conservative
allies work to repair a criminal justice system riddled with imperfections, they need to address how quotas influence internal enforcement
priorities and shape public conceptions of fairness.
Skeptics of incremental criminal justice reform—a group in which
I find membership—may believe that reforming the practice of police
quotas fails to confront the incorrigible nature of American policing.
The strongest version of this critique would likely come from abolitionists who resist reformist reforms that tinker at the edges of the
criminal justice system, as opposed to non-reformist reforms, which
“have as their end goal the eventual dismantling of that system and
are understood to be individual elements or steps in a larger strategy
of structural transformation.”350 This is a valid concern. Eliminating
police quotas cannot solve the problems of white supremacy and poverty management that are central to the criminal justice system, but
there are at least three reasons why abolitionists and radicals should
care about police quotas. These reasons are theoretical, tactical, and
temporal.
First, addressing the problem of quotas can be an important
interim step toward reducing the imprint of the penal state, which is
one goal of abolitionism.351 Enforcing quota statutes and stamping out
the practice elsewhere could shift the police away from understanding
civilians as “stats to be harvested” and reduce unnecessary police
encounters.352 Taken one step forward, addressing quotas could also
turn out to be especially necessary if the previously unorthodox, but
increasingly recognizable, goal of defunding the police is achieved.353
There is a strong reason to believe, based on the Camden example,
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that quotas could become more prominent in police forces with
reduced personnel.354
Finally, quotas speak directly to an emerging discourse about the
purpose of police. As this Article has shown, quota-based policing
applies sharp pressure to common-sense assumptions about the public
safety, crime-fighting conception of law enforcement. Attacking
quotas—which have demonstrable connections to financial exploitation and racial subjugation—is at least consonant with the abolitionist
insistence on rethinking punishment and reimagining the state’s relationship to vulnerable communities and the general population.

NORMATIVE

IV
PATHS FORWARD

05/11/2021 08:20:10

354 See supra text accompanying notes 177–88; Fussell, supra note 31; Rushin &
Michalski, supra note 30.
355 See FBI, WHITE SUPREMACIST INFILTRATION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 4 (2006),
https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/402521/doc-26-white-supremacist-infiltration.pdf;
Vida B. Johnson, KKK in the PD: White Supremacist Police and What to Do About It, 23
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 205, 211 (2019).
356 See Maciag, supra note 5.
357 See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
358 See Sparrow, supra note 34; NAT’L INST. OF JUST., PERSPECTIVES ON RESEARCH AND
EVIDENCE-BASED POLICING 15–20 (2020); GUL & O’CONNELL, supra note 13, at 51–98.
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What is one to do with these descriptive and definitional insights?
This Part offers some recommendations on how to curb police quotas.
Before beginning, I want to stress two things. First, any solution to the
problem of police quotas cannot be strictly legal. A gauntlet of obstacles—white supremacy,355 some jurisdictions’ narcotic addiction to
profit-based policing,356 judicial hostility to the enforcement of civil
rights in federal courts,357 and many others—are too mountainous for
any set of neat positive law or policy prescriptions. Any attempt to
curb quotas must be multi-pronged and multi-disciplinary.
Second, I do not try to propose better mechanisms for evaluating
or incentivizing the police. I resist that normative move because it has
already been taken up by criminologists358 but more importantly
because strategies for better policing dangerously invert the analysis.
Almost half of American states have legislatively determined that
police quotas are impermissible, and a few others have pending bills.
The crucial normative issues are not about substitute incentives or
evaluation metrics, but instead about how existing statutory schemes
can be improved and how they can be introduced to jurisdictions that
have not yet recognized the imprudence of police quotas.

43166-nyu_96-2 Sheet No. 111 Side A

05/11/2021 08:20:10

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\96-2\NYU203.txt

May 2021]

unknown

Seq: 63

POLICE QUOTAS

10-MAY-21

15:01

591

A. A Prospective Research Program

05/11/2021 08:20:10

359 See Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV. 151, 154 (2016)
(discussing how “the Supreme Court has steadily diminished the vigor of the Equal
Protection Clause”).
360 See RIC SIMMONS, SMART SURVEILLANCE: HOW TO INTERPRET THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 174 (2019).
361 See supra text accompanying note 324.
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Legal scholars must scrutinize police quotas as a critical component of the criminal justice system and as a practice that interacts with
other areas of law. Police quotas matter because they animate and
intersect with issues that legal scholars wrestle with, wrangle over, and
consider to be fundamental to ideas about quality and justice. Traditionally, legal scholars have relinquished the study of quotas to criminologists who have a different set of intellectual interests and
commitments. Instead of engaging directly with quotas, legal scholars
have either overlooked them, subsumed them within other categories
(e.g., broken windows policing), or given no more than pat acknowledgment of their existence. This Article supplies a framework for
understanding how police quotas work, how they are defended, and
why they are indefensible, but these formulations are only initial
steps.
The demonstrated existence of police quotas abrades core understandings of criminal law and constitutional procedure. What does it
mean when criminalization is not a product of wrongdoing, but is
instead spawned by police attempts to thwart employment sanctions
or garner occupational rewards? On the procedural side, the existence
of race-based police quotas has been verified by federal courts, police
officers, and sponsors of legislative prohibitions. How can this reality
be reconciled with our country’s frail Equal Protection jurisprudence359 or with an exception-riddled Fourth Amendment360 that
makes satisfying quotas at the expense of minorities fairly
straightforward?
For civil rights scholars, litigation involving police quotas highlights the disparity between actual government practices and stingy
judicial interpretations of what constitutes a custom or policy under
§ 1983. Civilians are not the only aggrieved subjects of quota-based
policing. Most of the relevant statutes are about work conditions.
Criminal justice scholars are increasingly devoting their attention to
labor law and employment law, and police quotas fit neatly into such
considerations.361 Examining the issue of police quotas may provide a
new entry point into thinking about live controversies in criminal justice administration and civil rights more generally.
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Quotas also showcase intragovernmental tensions that matter to
local government law scholars and legislative experts. In states where
they are prohibited, law enforcement leadership often imposes quotas
to demonstrate productivity.362 Scholars who study how governments
work could provide fruitful insights on how to enforce anti-quota statutes and how to counteract pathologies that stand in the way. Tax law
scholars could also help clarify the relationship between local tax
policy and policing for profit—which often serves as a substitute for
increased taxing.363 Police quotas are often the mechanisms for such
“taxation by citation”364 and make critical tax law scholars relevant
interlocutors.365
Outstanding empirical questions remain. Besides litigation outcomes and settlements, scholars and the general public do not have
any empirical data on the efficacy of quota statutes. It would be
helpful to know how jurisdictions with prohibitions compare to jurisdictions where quotas are permissible. Scholars should examine how
prohibitions affect a jurisdiction’s incidence of police misconduct, the
size of its misdemeanor docket, clearance rates, its reliance on legal
financial obligations (e.g., fees and fines), and the satisfaction of its
citizens. The results could help shed light on issues specific to criminal
justice as well as broader questions at the intersection of law and
inequality.
B.

Investigative Agendas and Public Awareness
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See NATAPOFF, supra note 298, at 59.
See supra notes 308, 312; Michael W. Sances & Hye Young You, Who Pays for
Government? Descriptive Representation and Exploitative Revenue Sources, 79 J. POLITICS
1090 (2017).
364 DICK M. CARPENTER, KYLE SWEETLAND & JENNIFER MCDONALD, INST. FOR JUST.,
THE PRICE OF TAXATION BY CITATION 5 (2019), https://ij.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/
Taxation-by-Citation-FINAL-USE.pdf.
365 See Nancy J. Knauer, Critical Tax Policy: A Pathway to Reform?, 9 NW. J.L. & SOC.
POL’Y 206, 254 (2014); Anthony C. Infanti, Tax Equity, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1191, 1196 (2008)
(discussing the concept of tax equity and its applications).
366 Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587 (1976).
363
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The media should continue to play an important role in uncovering and publicizing the existence of police quotas. As Justice
Brennan correctly observed, “[c]ommentary and reporting on the
criminal justice system is at the core of First Amendment values, for
the operation and integrity of that system is of crucial import to citizens concerned with the administration of government.”366 Interestingly, Justice Brennan’s comments were in a decision that involved
media reporting on a murder trial. This felony-centric, trial-oriented
understanding of criminal justice does not represent the bulk of cases
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367 NATAPOFF, supra note 298 at 218 (describing the misdemeanor process, which
represents the bulk of criminal justice cases, as “sloppy, inaccurate, unpredictable and
disrespectful”).
368 Nebraska Press Ass’n, 427 U.S. at 587.
369 See Paul Farhi & Elahe Izadi, Journalists Are Reexamining Their Reliance on a
Longtime Source: The Police, WASH. POST (June 30, 2020), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/media/journalists-are-reexamining-their-reliance-on-alongtime-source-the-police/2020/06/30/303c929c-b63a-11ea-a510-55bf26485c93_story.html
(discussing how some journalists are now unwilling to take the police’s account of events
“at face value”).
370 See supra text accompanying notes 35, 240, 245.
371 See CRIME + PUNISHMENT, supra note 68; Rayman, supra note 120; Rayman, supra
note 121; Rayman, supra note 122; Tracy Oppenheimer, Auburn Cop Fired for Resisting
Quotas Gets Online Support; City Officials Deny Deny Deny, REASON (July 26, 2013, 10:45
AM), https://reason.com/2013/07/26/online-community-comes-to-whistle-blower.
372 See Cohn & Quealy, supra note 8.
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that are currently churned through the system. Slapdash misdemeanor
processing better approximates the criminal justice system.367 Nevertheless, Justice Brennan’s observations maintain relevance. Journalism
still “contribute[s] to the public’s understanding of . . . the . . . criminal
justice system” and can address some of its failures.368
The task of local news outlets and investigative journalists is to
look beyond trials and examine police conduct and practices. This is
not a simple task, but our current political climate is ripe for such
scrutiny. First, many news outlets are increasingly reexamining their
longstanding fidelity to police accounts. They are more willing to disbelieve how police describe criminal justice administration.369 This
reconsideration is undoubtedly influenced by social protest movements and video evidence of brutality that often contradicts initial
police accounts. This journalistic skepticism should apply to the longstanding insistence of police leaders that they do not administer
quotas despite evidence suggesting otherwise.370 Second, the current
legal landscape will also enable journalistic investigation into police
quotas. The Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence, which generally
does not protect officers from retaliation if they object to quotas in
their employee capacity, essentially funnels their speech into the
public sphere. Many of the litigated quota cases involve officers who
leaked information to the media.371 Finally, the general public’s
increasing recognition of the bias and brutality of American law
enforcement is creating space for a more receptive audience to journalistic accounts of police quotas.372
Local news, mainstream media, and nonprofit investigative
reporters are well-situated to more robustly examine police quotas. In
places like Charleston, Rhode Island, and Damascus, Arkansas, media
reporting on police quotas have led to the ACLU sending letters to all
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police chiefs in the state reminding them of the illegality of quotas373
and the loss of the right to issue tickets,374 respectively. Mainstream
news outlets like the socialist Jacobin,375 the moderate New York
Times,376 the libertarian Reason,377 and the conservative Washington
Examiner 378 have all reported on police quotas and done so in unfavorable terms. The same is true for criminal justice-specific outlets
such as The Marshall Project 379 and The Appeal.380
All of these organizations have the infrastructure to probe how
police quotas operate. They know how to gather difficult-to-obtain
documents and data like evaluation reports that demonstrate the existence of quotas and testimonial evidence.381 Drawing from these
sources, the media can shape public understanding by giving coverage
to officers and civilians who have persuasive evidence that they have
been governed by or subject to police quotas. Since, as discussed in
Part II, many allegations of police quotas do not make it to courts or
get quietly settled, journalistic accounts can be crucial to encouraging
policy changes or legislative reform.
Reporters can also probe the connections between quotas and
other pathologies. In states that do not have prohibitions on quotas,
journalists—armed with a deeper understanding of how quotas
operate—could examine how this practice is tied to police misconduct,
policing for profit, and racial profiling. In states that have legislated
against police quotas, reporters should consider these requirements
within the larger category of police corruption that has been of
interest to journalists. Overall, the public has traditionally understood
43166-nyu_96-2 Sheet No. 112 Side B
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373 Patrick Anderson, RI ACLU to Police Departments: Traffic Ticket Quotas Are
Illegal, PROVIDENCE J. (Nov. 28, 2017, 4:38 PM), https://www.providencejournal.com/news/
20171128/ri-aclu-to-police-departments-traffic-ticket-quotas-are-illegal.
374 Debra Hale-Shelton, Arkansas Town’s Bid to Lift Speed-Trap Sanctions Denied: Still
Can’t Write Tickets, ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE (May 17, 2018, 4:30 AM), https://
www.arkansasonline.com/news/2018/may/17/damascus-bid-denied-still-can-t-write-t.
375 See Nick Tabor, The Mayor Who Cracked Down on Baltimore, JACOBIN (May 14,
2015), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/05/omalley-baltimore-clinton-democraticprimary-president.
376 See Goldstein et al., supra note 309.
377 See Oppenheimer, supra note 371.
378 See Editorial, Arrests Should Be Based on Crimes, Not Quotas, WASH. EXAMINER
(June 6, 2006, 12:00 AM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/editorial-arrests-shouldbe-based-on-crimes-not-quotas.
379 Ken Armstrong, How to Fix American Policing, MARSHALL PROJECT (July 13, 2016,
10:00 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/07/13/how-to-fix-american-policing.
380 See George Joseph, NYPD Commander’s Text Messages Show How the Quota
System Persists, APPEAL (Dec. 12, 2018), https://theappeal.org/nypd-commanders-textmessages-show-how-the-quota-system-persists.
381 See DAVID CUILLIER & CHARLES N. DAVIS, THE ART OF ACCESS: STRATEGIES FOR
ACQUIRING PUBLIC RECORDS 114–26 (2011) (chronicling methods for handling evasive
agency responses and noting the success of some news organizations’ tactics).
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the media as a government watchdog.382 This oversight function is no
different in the area of police quotas.
C.

Statutory Reform
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382 See JAMES L. AUCOIN, THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM
12 (2005).
383 See infra Appendix B.
384 See, e.g., N.J. STATE ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, LEGISLATIVE POSITION PAPER:
OPPOSITION TO S1105 / A2126 (2016), https://www.njsacop.org/Files/NJSACOP%
20Position%20Paper%20-%20Opposition%20to%20S1105%20%20A2126.pdf (opposing
amendments to state anti-quota law).
385 See supra Section I.B.
386 See infra Appendix C.
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The remaining issues concern getting quota provisions enacted in
states without them and improving existing statutes. Enacting new
statutes is simultaneously straightforward and challenging. It is
straightforward because bipartisan support has already helped get
quota bills passed in many states and objections to police quotas have
been made by interest groups across the ideological spectrum. At the
same time, getting quota statutes on the books is not easy, as demonstrated by the nine states that have drafted bills but have not been
able to convert them to enacted legislation; some of these bills were
drafted more than a decade ago.383 Police chiefs and politicians worry
that these bills will hamper their ability to evaluate officers.384 The
research and investigative agendas mentioned above could engender
more public awareness, whereas intentional partnerships could move
the legislative ball forward. South Carolina, Missouri, and
Tennessee—all states that recently adopted statutes—did so by considering and representing that quotas impacted a cross-section of
diverse interests.385
The other task is to shore up existing statutes. Most anti-quota
laws have appreciable shortcomings, including ambiguity about
whether they apply to informal requirements, and loopholes for stops
and warnings. To this end, the Appendix includes the skeleton of a
model statute addressing some of these shortcomings and collating the
best features of existing legislation.386 It is far from comprehensive
since this Article cannot supply answers to critical questions about
future implementation. But, it is a starting point for statutory amendments as well as consideration of new anti-quota laws.
The model statute also proposes an additional provision that is
not found in existing quota statutes and requires explanation: Pension
forfeiture should be a consequence of violating the statute. This may
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sound like an extraordinary ramification.387 But many states already
have laws that either revoke, reduce, or suspend the pensions of
public employees who have been convicted of a felony388 or any crime
related to their public employment.389 West Virginia’s pension forfeiture law is arguably the most liberal, simply stating that “honorable
service is a condition to receiving any pension, annuity, disability payment or any other benefit under a retirement plan.”390 The efficacy of
quota statutes is still an open empirical question, but it is clear from
the litigation discussed in Part II that police continue to implement
police quotas even in states that prohibit them. Where judicial avenues for redress are limited, pension forfeiture can be a potential
deterrent. The measure has been proposed by police abolitionists,391
and economists have tentatively found that states with stronger pension forfeiture laws experience lower rates of police misconduct.392
Adding a pension forfeiture provision could add teeth to existing statutes and help stamp out stubborn police quotas.
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387 James Jacobs and his colleagues have analyzed arguments for and against pension
forfeiture and conclude that imprisonment and fines would be better sanctions. This
suggestion might be subject to concerns about “progressive punitivism” that uses
incarceration to advance social justice goals. Jacobs and his colleagues do suggest a model
for pension revocation that would be less harsh than some states’ schemes. See James B.
Jacobs, Coleen Friel & Edward O’Callaghan, Pension Forfeiture: A Problematic Sanction
for Public Corruption, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 57, 89–91 (1997); Hadar Aviram, Progressive
Punitivism: Notes on the Use of Punitive Social Control to Advance Social Justice Ends, 68
BUFF. L. REV. 199, 201–02 (2020).
388 See, e.g., 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-156 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 101-651);
VA. CODE ANN. § 51.1-124.13 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess.); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2929.192 (West, Westlaw through File 60 of 133d Gen. Assemb. 2019-2020); N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 135-18.10 (West, Westlaw through S.L. 2020-97 of 2020 Reg. Sess.).
389 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 32, § 15(4) (West, Westlaw through ch. 226 of 2020 2d
Ann. Sess.) (“In no event shall any member after final conviction of a criminal offense
involving violation of the laws applicable to his office or position, be entitled to receive a
retirement allowance.”); GA. CODE ANN. § 47-1-21(b) (West, Westlaw through 2020 Legis.
Sess.) (“If a public employee commits a public employment related crime . . . in the
capacity of a public employee and is convicted for the commission of such crime, such
employee’s membership in any public retirement system shall terminate on the date of
final conviction and such employee shall not at any time thereafter be eligible for
membership in any public retirement system.”); see also ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 37.10.310
(West, Westlaw through ch. 32 of 2020 2d Reg. Sess.); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 17062
(West, Westlaw through 2019 2d Reg. Sess.); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:1-3.1(b)(17) (West,
Westlaw through L.2020, c.127 & J.R. No.2); 43 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 1313(a) (West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess. Act 95); 36 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 3610.1-3 (West, Westlaw through ch. 79 of 2020 2d Reg. Sess.).
390 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5-10A-1 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess.).
391 See Reformist Reforms vs. Abolitionist Steps in Policing, CRITICAL RESISTANCE,
https://www.criticalresistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/CR_NoCops_reform_vs_
abolition_REV2020.pdf (last visited Dec. 30, 2020).
392 See D. Bruce Johnsen & Adam David Marcus, Pension Forfeiture and Police
Misconduct, 14 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 1, 30 (2017).
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CONCLUSION
Although police quotas have escaped serious in-depth scrutiny, a
diverse cross-section of the public rejects their use and believes that
criminal sanctions should not be tied to law enforcement statistics or
incentives. This Article provides descriptive insights into how police
quotas work and why they are a pressing criminal justice issue.
Moving forward, interim and long-term strategies must confront the
reality that, across the country, quotas are a basic feature of policing.
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APPENDIX A. STATE STATUTES
State

Statutory Prohibitions on Police Quotas
Statute Title
Statute Overview

Arkansas

ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-6302 (West, Westlaw
through 2020 1st
Extraordinary Sess. and
2020 Fiscal Sess.)

No state or local agency employing law
enforcement officers engaged in the enforcement of
any motor vehicle traffic laws of this state or any
local ordinance governing motor vehicle traffic may
establish any policy requiring any law enforcement
officer to meet an arrest quota . . . .

California

CAL. VEH. CODE § 41602
(West, Westlaw through
Ch. 372 of 2020 Reg.
Sess.)

No state or local agency . . . may establish any
policy requiring any peace officer or parking
enforcement employees to meet an arrest quota.

Connecticut

Florida

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 7-282d (West, Westlaw
through 2020 Reg. Sess.)
Imposition of traffic ticket
quotas prohibited

Illinois
65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/11-1-12 (West, Westlaw
through P.A. 101-651)
Quotas prohibited

8(b): A traffic enforcement agency may not
establish a traffic citation quota.

The Department may not require a Department of
State Police officer to issue a specific number of
citations within a designated period of time.

05/11/2021 08:20:10

A municipality may not require a police officer
to issue a specific number of citations within a
designated period of time. This prohibition shall
not affect the conditions of any federal or State
grants or funds awarded to the municipality and
used to fund traffic enforcement programs.
A municipality may not, for purposes of
evaluating a police officer’s job performance,
compare the number of citations issued by the
police officer to the number of citations issued by
any other police officer who has similar job
duties.
Nothing in this Section shall prohibit a
municipality from evaluating a police officer
based on the police officer’s points of contact.

43166-nyu_96-2 Sheet No. 114 Side B

FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 316.640
(West, Westlaw through
Ch. 184 of 2020 2d Reg.
Sess.)
20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
2610/24 (West, Westlaw
through P.A. 101-651)
State Police quotas
prohibited

No municipal police department may impose any
quota with respect to the issuance of . . .
summonses for motor vehicle violations upon
any policeman in such department.
“Quota” means a specified number of . . .
summonses for motor vehicle violations to be
issued within a specified period of time.
Nothing in this section shall prohibit such
department from using data concerning the
issuance of . . . summonses in the evaluation of an
individual’s work performance provided such
data is not the exclusive means of evaluating such
performance.
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No municipality or any police department . . . shall
establish or maintain, formally or informally, a plan
to evaluate, promote, compensate, or discipline a
LA. STAT. ANN.
law enforcement officer on the basis of the officer
§ 40:2401.1 (West,
making a predetermined or specified number of any
Westlaw through 2020 2d type or combination of types of arrests or require or
Extraordinary Sess.)
suggest to a law enforcement officer, that the law
Prohibition against quotas enforcement officer is required or expected to make
a predetermined or specified number of any type or
combination of types of arrests within a specified
period.
(a) In this section, “quota” means the mandating of
a finite number of arrests made or citations issued
that a law enforcement officer must meet in a
specified time period.
(b) A law enforcement agency may not: (1)
establish a formal or informal quota for the law
enforcement agency or law enforcement officers of
the agency; or (2) use the number of arrests made
or citations issued by a law enforcement officer as
the sole or primary criterion for promotion,
MD. CODE ANN. PUB.
demotion, dismissal, or transfer of the officer.
SAFETY § 3-504 (West,
(c) This section does not preclude a law
Westlaw through 2020
enforcement agency from: (1) using quantitative
Reg. Sess.)
data for arrests, citations, and other law
enforcement activities as management tools or in
evaluating performance; (2) collecting, analyzing,
and applying information concerning the number of
arrests and citations in order to ensure that a
particular law enforcement officer or group of law
enforcement officers does not violate an applicable
legal obligation; or (3) assessing the proportion of
the arrests made and citations issued by a law
enforcement officer or group of law enforcement
officers.

05/11/2021 08:20:10

A police officer shall not be required to issue a
predetermined or specified number of citations
for violations of this act or of local ordinances
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
substantially corresponding to provisions of this
§ 257.750 (West, Westlaw
act, including parking or standing violations.
through P.A. 2020, No.
256 of 2020 Reg. Sess.)
A police officer’s performance evaluation system
shall not require a predetermined or specified
number of citations to be issued.
A law enforcement agency may not order, mandate,
require, or suggest to a peace officer a quota for the
MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 169.985 (West, Westlaw issuance of traffic citations, including administrative
through 2020 Reg. Sess.) citations authorized under section 169.999, on a
daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly, or yearly basis.
No political subdivision or law enforcement agency
shall have a policy requiring or encouraging an
MO. ANN. STAT. § 304.125
employee to issue a certain number of citations for
(West, Westlaw through
traffic violations on a daily, weekly, monthly,
2020 2d Reg. Sess.)
quarterly, yearly, or other quota basis. This section
shall not apply to the issuance of warning citations.
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NEB. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 48-235 (West, Westlaw
through end of 2020 2d
Reg. Sess.)

New Jersey

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:14181.2 (West, Westlaw
through L.2020, c.136 and
J.R. No. 2)

New York

N.Y. LAB. LAW § 215-a
(McKinney, Westlaw
through L.2019, ch. 758
and L.2020, chs. 1 to 387)
Discrimination against
employees for failure to
meet certain ticket quotas
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A state agency or political subdivision shall not
directly require a law enforcement officer employed
by the state agency or political subdivision to issue a
certain number or percentage of traffic citations,
police citations, memoranda of traffic violations,
memoranda of faulty equipment, or any other type
of citation on any periodic basis.
A State, county or municipal police department
. . . shall not establish any quota for arrests or
citations.
The department or force shall not use the
number of arrests or citations issued by a law
enforcement officer as the sole criterion for
promotion, demotion, dismissal, or the earning of
any benefit provided by the department or force.
No employer or his or her duly authorized agent
shall transfer or in any other manner penalize or
threaten . . . based in whole or in part on such
employee’s failure to meet a quota . . . .

Rhode
Island

31 R.I. GEN. LAWS 31-2725 (West, Westlaw
through ch. 79 of 2020 2d
Reg. Sess.)
Ticket quotas prohibited

05/11/2021 08:20:10

No state or municipal agency engaged in the
enforcement of any motor vehicle traffic or
parking laws of this state, or any local ordinance
governing motor vehicle traffic or parking, may
establish or maintain any policy, formally or
informally, requiring any officer to meet a quota.
“Quota” means any requirement regarding the
number of arrests or investigative stops made, or
summonses or citations issued, by an officer
regarding motor vehicle traffic or parking
violations.
Nothing contained herein shall preclude a local
or municipal agency from using data concerning
arrests or investigative stops made, or
summonses or citations issued, and their
disposition in the evaluation of an officer’s work
performance, provided such data is not the
exclusive means of evaluating such performance.
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The Secretary of Public Safety shall not make or
permit to be made any order, rule, or regulation
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
requiring the issuance of any minimum number
§ 20-187.3 (West, Westlaw
of traffic citations, or ticket quotas . . . .
North
through S.L. 2020-97 of
Carolina
Pay
and promotions of members of the Highway
2020 Reg. Sess.)
Patrol shall be based on their overall job
Quotas prohibited
performance and not on the basis of the volume
of citations issued or arrests made.
No political subdivision or agency of the
Commonwealth shall have the power or authority
71 PA. STAT. AND CONS. to order, mandate, require or in any other manner,
STAT. ANN. § 2001 (West, directly or indirectly, suggest to any police officer
Pennsylvania
Westlaw through 2020
. . . that said police officer . . . shall issue a certain
Reg. Sess. Act 95)
number of traffic citations, tickets or any other type
of citation on any daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly
or yearly basis.
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S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1245 (West, Westlaw
through 2020 Sess.)

TENN. CODE ANN. § 3916-516 (West, Westlaw
through end of 2020 2d
Extraordinary Sess.)
Traffic offense citation
quotas — Performance
standards
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A law enforcement agency, department, or
division may not require a law enforcement
officer employed by the agency, department, or
division to issue a specific amount or meet a
quota for the number of citations he issues
during a designated period of time.
An employee of a law enforcement agency,
department, or division who files a report with an
appropriate authority alleging a violation of the
provisions contained in this section is protected
by the provisions contained in Chapter 27, Title
8. (D) As contained in this section: (1) “law
enforcement agency, department, or division”
includes, but is not limited to, municipal police
departments, sheriff departments, the Highway
Patrol, SLED, and other agencies that enforce
state and local laws; (2) “quota” means a fixed or
predetermined amount; (3) “points of contact”
means a law enforcement officer’s interaction
with citizens and businesses within their
jurisdictions and the law enforcement officer’s
involvement in community-oriented initiatives.
Nothing in this section shall prohibit a law
enforcement agency, department, or division
from evaluating an officer’s performance based
on the officer’s points of contact.
A public official or employee shall not establish
or maintain, formally or informally, a plan to
evaluate, promote, compensate, or discipline a
law enforcement officer solely by the issuance of
a predetermined or specified number of any type
or combination of types of traffic citations.
A public official or public employee shall not
require or suggest to a law enforcement officer
that the law enforcement officer is required or
expected to issue a predetermined or specified
number of any type or combination of types of
traffic citations within a specified period.
Nothing in this section shall prohibit a municipal
corporation, a political subdivision or any agency
of this state, from establishing performance
standards for law enforcement officers that
include issuance of traffic citations, but do not
require issuance of a predetermined or specified
number or any type or combination of types of
citations as the sole means of meeting such
performance standards.
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Tennessee

Replaced by Act of July
15, 2020, ch. 801, 2020
Tenn. Pub Acts, https://
publications.tnsosfiles.
com/acts/111/pub/
pc0801.pdf.
See also TENN. CODE
ANN. § 50-1-304
(West, Westlaw through
end of 2020 2d
Extraordinary Sess.)
(Whistleblower Act)
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A political subdivision or an agency of this state
may not establish or maintain, formally or
informally, a plan to evaluate, promote,
compensate, or discipline a peace officer
according to the officer’s issuance of a
predetermined or specified number of any type
TEX. TRANSP. CODE
or combination of types of traffic citations . . . .
ANN. § 720.002 (West,
Westlaw through end of
A political subdivision or an agency of this state
2019 Reg. Sess.)
may not require or suggest to a peace officer, a
Prohibition on Trafficjustice of the peace, or a judge of a county court,
Offense Quotas
statutory county court, municipal court, or
municipal court of record . . . that the peace
officer is required or expected to issue a
predetermined or specified number of any type
or combination of types of traffic citations within
a specified period.
A political subdivision or law enforcement agency
employing a peace officer may not require or direct
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7that a peace officer meet a law enforcement quota.
27 (West, Westlaw
Subsection (2) does not prohibit a political
through 2020 6th Spec.
subdivision or law enforcement agency from
Sess.)
including a peace officer’s engagement with the
Quotas for arrest, citation
community or enforcement activity as part of an
prohibited
overall determination of the peace officer’s
performance.
WIS. STAT. ANN.
No state agency or political subdivision of this state
§ 349.025 (West, Westlaw
may require a law enforcement officer to issue a
through 2019 Act 186)
specific number of citations, complaints or warning
Quotas relating to the
notices during any specified time period for
enforcement of traffic
violations of traffic regulations.
regulations prohibited
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APPENDIX B. STATE BILLS
State

Arizona

Colorado

District of
Columbia

Prohibits municipalities, police departments, boards of
supervisors, sheriffs and DPS from:
implementing or establishing a traffic complaint
quota for peace officers (officers) employed by a
police department, sheriff’s department or DPS;
H.R. 2410, 52d Leg., 1st
basing
the determination of an officer’s rank or
Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2015)
classification on the number of traffic complaints
the officer issues; or
consider[ing] the number of traffic complaints an
officer issues as a factor when determining the
officer’s rank or classification.
16-2.5-311. Arrest Quotas.
An employing agency may not establish any policy
requiring any peace officer to meet an arrest quota.
S. 84, 67th Gen.
Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess.
An employing agency may not use the number of
(Colo. 2010)
arrests or citations issued by a peace officer as the
sole criteria for promotion, demotion, reprimand
....
Sense of the Council in
Finding that “some MTPD officers had created and
Support of Enhanced
were participating in a ‘game’ in which officers were
Metro Transit Police
rewarded for making arrests and issuing citations.”
Department Oversight
Resolution of 2020, 67
Establishing an independent review body to
D.C. Reg. 14611 (Dec.
address officer complaints.
1, 2020)

H.R. 738, 2009 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Ga. 2009) 2009 Bill
Text GA H.B. 738

No local governing authority, law enforcement unit,
or peace officer shall by influence or demand
require that peace officers employed by a law
enforcement unit meet quotas for arrests or the
issuance of citations or otherwise increase or
maintain the number of arrests or citations for the
purpose of providing or increasing revenue.
No local governing authority shall withhold or
decrease or threaten, suggest, or imply that such
local governing authority will withhold or decrease
any funding, revenues, or the operation budget for
a law enforcement unit that fails to meet quotas for
arrests or the issuance of citations or otherwise fails
to increase or maintain the number of arrests or
citations for the purpose of maintaining or
increasing revenue.
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[A] state or local law enforcement agency in this state
shall not:
establish or carry out a policy that requires or
encourages, either directly or indirectly, a police
officer employed by the law enforcement agency to
S. 390, 1999 Leg., 70th
meet a quota for issuing citations or making arrests.
Nevada
Sess. (Nev. 1999)
consider the number of citations issued or arrests
made by police officers employed by the law
enforcement agency when determining the needs of
the agency with respect to equipment, funding or
staffing.
A sheriff shall not . . .
establish a formal or informal quota that requires a
deputy to make a specific number of arrests or issue
H.R. 1376, 2015 Sess.
a specific number of summonses within a
Virginia
(Va. 2015)
designated period of time.
use the number of arrests made or summonses
issued by a deputy as the sole criterion for
evaluating a deputy’s job performance.
The number of citations issued by a law enforcement
officer for traffic infractions, or the amount of
S.R. 6316, 66th Leg.,
penalties assessed from the issuance of such citations,
Washington
Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2020) may not be considered in any performance review,
evaluation, rating, assessment, salary, promotion, or
assignment of the law enforcement officer.
1992 Bill Tracking W.
Any state or local agency . . .
Va. H.R. 4037
May not establish policy or expectations requiring
Prohibiting the use of
any officer to meet an arrest quota or use the
ticket writing quotas by
number of arrests or citations issued by an officer as
the Department of
West
the criterion for promotion, demotion, dismissal or
Public Safety
Virginia
the earning of any benefit provided by the agency.
May not use the number of arrests or citations
H.B. 2984 (W. Va. 2000)
issued by their officers as the criterion for funding,
Prohibiting arrest
staffing or equipment needs.
quotas
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No political subdivision or law enforcement agency employing a
law enforcement officer shall require or suggest, directly or indirectly,
that a law enforcement officer should follow a quota.
“Quota” means a specified average, percentage, or number of
warnings, stops, citations, or arrests to be issued on any daily, weekly,
monthly, quarterly or yearly basis.
No political subdivision or law enforcement agency employing a
law enforcement officer shall use the number of warnings, stops, citations, or arrests issued by a law enforcement officer as the sole or
primary criterion for an officer’s demotion, penalization, transfer, termination, constructive dismissal, promotion, or earning of any benefit.
Any officer penalized for failing to adhere to a quota system shall
be fully compensated and shall be provided an avenue of legal remedy
beyond the unit’s internal complaint system.
A violation of this section is a Class B misdemeanor, subject to
pension forfeiture only.
A court of this State shall enter an order of pension forfeiture
pursuant to this section immediately upon a finding of guilt by the
trier of fact or a plea of guilty entered in any court of this State unless
the court, for good cause shown, orders a stay of the pension forfeiture pending a hearing on the merits at the time of sentencing.
Nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude the authority
of the board of trustees of any State or locally-administered pension
fund or retirement system created under the laws of this State from
ordering the forfeiture of all or part of the earned service credit or
pension or retirement benefit of any member of the fund or system for
misconduct occurring during the member’s public service.
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